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Unable to secure passage of a federal constitutional amendment 
abolishing the Electoral College, several opponents of the Electoral 
College have sought to establish the direct, popular election of the 
President via an interstate compact according to which individual 
signatory states agree to appoint their presidential electors in 
accordance with the nationwide popular vote. Ostensibly designed to 
prevent elections, such as the one in 2000, in which the Electoral College 
“misfired” and chose the candidate who received fewer popular votes, 
the National Popular Vote Compact has been adopted by several states, 
including California. In this Article, I argue that the National Popular 
Vote Compact violates the Presidential Elections Clause of Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution. Although the text of the Clause seems to give states 
unlimited power to select the manner in which each state’s presidential 
electors are chosen, a close reading of U.S. history suggests the need 
and propriety of limiting the scope of state authority under the Clause. 
Not only did the framers of the Constitution expressly reject the idea of a 
direct, popular election for President, but also not one state either in the 
wake of ratification or at any time thereafter has ever sought to appoint 
its presidential electors on the basis of votes cast outside the state, as the 
National Popular Vote Compact requires. In the same way that similar 
historical considerations led the U.S. Supreme Court to limit the scope of 
state authority with respect to federal legislative elections, this history 
regarding the Presidential Elections Clause likewise counsels in favor of 
a more limited understanding of state authority under Article II. As such, 
if opponents wish to abolish the Electoral College, the sole 
constitutionally proper mechanism for doing so is a federal 
constitutional amendment, not an interstate compact negotiated by a 
handful of states. 
 
  Ken & Claudia Peterson Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Constitutional 
Government, Willamette University. AB, Harvard University; JD, New York University. I thank the 
participants at the faculty workshops at the University of Illinois and Arizona State University for 
their helpful comments and suggestions regarding prior versions of this Article. 
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The 2000 presidential election was an eye opener for many 
Americans. To the consternation of many, the candidate who won the 
most popular votes nationwide actually lost the contest.1 In the election’s 
wake, popular attention centered upon the Electoral College and its role 
in the presidential election. Under the U.S. Constitution, the people do 
not directly vote for the President in a nationwide election; rather, the 
people in each state vote for electors from that state, who in turn cast the 
constitutionally decisive votes for President and Vice President. 
Moreover, not only is the people’s influence indirect, the Electoral 
College’s voting pattern does not necessarily track the national popular 
vote. The allocation of electors to each state based on their representation 
in Congress, coupled with the use of winner-take-all voting in forty-eight 
of the fifty states, has produced an electoral system in which the electoral 
vote for the winning candidate may differ significantly from the 
nationwide popular vote.2 In rare instances, such as in 2000, this process 
may produce a President who received fewer popular votes nationwide 
than the losing candidate. The New York Times presumably spoke for 
many when, in the wake of the 2000 election, it labeled the Electoral 
College an “antidemocratic relic.”3 
To be sure, the Electoral College has long been the target of 
criticism. Of the 11,000 constitutional amendments proposed in Congress 
in its history, over 1,000 have dealt with the Electoral College, and many 
of those have sought to implement a direct popular election of the 
President. In fact, bills proposing a constitutional amendment to abolish 
the Electoral College are routinely introduced in every Congress. 
Nevertheless, these proposals have all failed to pass Congress. In fact, 
over forty years have passed since Congress seriously considered a 
constitutional amendment abolishing the College.4 Popular support for 
 
 1. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2000 (2000). 
 2. In 1980, for example, Ronald Reagan received only 50.8% of the national popular vote 
but won 44 states, comprising 489 (91%) of the 538 electoral votes. David Leip, 1980 Presidential 
General Election Results, ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://usele 
ctionatlas.org/RESULTS/national.php?year=1980&off=0&f=1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). 
 3. Editorial, Drop Out of the College, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2006, at A26. 
 4. L. PAIGE WHITAKER & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30804, THE 
ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS 15 (2001); William 
Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIS. 145, 150 (1996). In 
1969, the House of Representatives passed an amendment abolishing the College, but it failed to 
secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate. Sanford Levinson, Is Moderation Sufficient 
When Addressing the Ills of the Electoral College?, 6 ELECTION L.J. 220, 222 (2007). In 1979, a 
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constitutional reform, it seems, is widespread but too shallow to 
overcome the high hurdle of Article V. 
Dissatisfied with the failure of Congress to pass a constitutional 
amendment abolishing the Electoral College, several reform-minded 
citizens, including law professors Akhil Amar, Vikram Amar, and Robert 
Bennett, came up with a novel way to transform the manner in which the 
nation elects its President that avoided the time-consuming and daunting 
process required for a constitutional amendment.5 Their idea, known as 
the “National Popular Vote Interstate Compact” or “NPVC,” was to have 
a large group of states agree to appoint their presidential electors in 
accordance with the national popular vote rather than their respective 
statewide popular vote.6 Once states comprising a majority of the 
Electoral College signed on, the NPVC would go into effect and, 
according to its proponents, the national popular vote would conclusively 
decide the winner of the election regardless of whether all the states 
agreed or a constitutional amendment abolishing the college was 
adopted. In essence, these reformers sought to use the coordinated action 
of a number of states to turn the Electoral College into the vehicle of its 
own reform. 
To date, eight states and the District of Columbia have formally 
joined the compact, and several other states have moved toward joining 
it.7 Moreover, public opinion polls show widespread, bipartisan popular 
support for moving to the direct popular election of the President, as the 
 
similar amendment was rejected by the Senate by a vote of 51–48. 125 CONG. REC. 17,766 (1979). 
 5. See Robert W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the President Without 
a Constitutional Amendment, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 141, 148 (2002); Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David 
Amar, How to Achieve Direct National Election of the President Without Amending the Constitution: 
Part Three of a Three-Part Series on the 2000 Election and the Electoral College, FINDLAW (Dec. 
28, 2001), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/2001122 8.html. 
 6. Robert Bennett, as well as the Amar brothers, originally proposed that each state 
implement this reform through coordinated, contingent legislation in each state. Robert W. Bennett, 
Popular Election of the President Without a Constitutional Amendment, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 241, 244–
45 (2001); Amar & Amar, supra note 5. Later, John Koza championed the idea that the agreement be 
formally memorialized in an interstate compact. JOHN KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-
BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 247 (2d ed. 2008). 
 7. See National Popular Vote Interstate Agreement Act of 2010, 57 D.C. Reg. 9869; 
Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2008 Haw. Sess. 
Laws 205; Act effective Jan. 1, 2009, 2008 Ill. Laws 1; Presidential Elections—Agreement Among 
the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2007 Md. Laws 855; Agreement Among 
the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2010 Mass. Acts ch. 229; Agreement 
Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 2007 N.J. Laws 2094; 
Presidential Election—Popular Vote—States’ Agreement—Washington, 2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 
1390. 
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NPVC seeks to do. Indeed, by one recent poll, seventy-two percent of 
Americans favor dispensing with the Electoral College and moving to a 
direct popular election.8 Calls to reform the Electoral College have an 
obvious and intuitive appeal to Americans, who have an abiding faith in 
the virtue and essential justice of majoritarian democracy. 
As I have written elsewhere,9 claims that the Electoral College 
thwarts the majority will are grossly overstated; the Electoral College 
typically tracks rather than thwarts popular sentiment. As such, I am 
skeptical of the need for reform, but, even assuming, arguendo, that the 
Electoral College system should be replaced, the NPVC is the wrong 
way to go about such reform. Much has been written about the NPVC, 
including its constitutionality.10 Somewhat surprisingly, however, 
constitutional commentators have focused exclusively on the questions 
whether the NPVC violates the Compact Clause of Article I, Section 10, 
or the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.11 No one has undertaken a 
sustained analysis of the more fundamental (and, in my view, 
analytically prior) question whether Article II, Section 1 permits states, 
acting alone or in concert with others, to appoint presidential electors in 
accordance with the national popular vote. To the extent that 
commentators acknowledge the issue, the conventional view is that states 
have absolute discretion to appoint their delegates in any manner they 
see fit. Indeed, for some commentators, the point is not even arguable.12 
 
 8. WASH. POST–KAISER FAMILY FOUND.–HARVARD UNIV. SURVEY PROJECT, SURVEY OF 
POLITICAL INDEPENDENTS 12–13 (2007), available at http://www.nationalpopularvote 
.com/resources/Wash-Post-Kaiser-Harvard-June-2007.pdf. 
 9. Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, 
and the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173 (2011). 
 10. See, e.g., David Gringer, Why the National Popular Vote Plan Is the Wrong Way to 
Abolish the Electoral College, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2008); Brandon H. Robb, Making the 
Electoral College Work Today: The Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National 
Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L. REV. 419 (2008); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1499 (2009). In addition, the Election Law Journal held a symposium devoted entirely to the 
NPVC. See Jamin B. Raskin, Neither the Red States nor the Blue States but the United States: The 
National Popular Vote and American Political Democracy, 7 ELECTION L.J. 188 (2008). 
 11. See, e.g., Stanley Chang, Updating the Electoral College: The National Popular Vote 
Legislation, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 205 (2007); Kristin Feeley, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected 
President, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1427 (2009); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the 
President: Using or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218, 220 (2008); Derek T. 
Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, 6 ELECTION L.J. 
372 (2007); Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for Electoral Reform, 40 AKRON. L. REV. 717 
(2007); Tushnet, supra note 10, at 1500 n.5. 
 12. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 10, at 193 (arguing that no one seriously contests the 
constitutionality of the NPVC “because it is so clearly within the plenary power of the states to 
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Disagreeing with this conventional wisdom, this Article concludes that 
the states lack the power to appoint their presidential electors on the basis 
of votes of citizens outside the state’s jurisdiction and, therefore, states 
are without authority to adopt the NPVC. 
Although Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution entrusts to the 
state legislatures the power to determine the manner in which 
presidential electors are selected, that power is not plenary in the 
customary sense. Rather, that power is limited, and the extent of that 
limitation is borne out by the historical understanding of the scope of 
state authority under Article II. At the time of the Framing of the U.S. 
Constitution, the framers envisioned a system in which states would 
select electors in accordance with the sentiments of state citizens, not the 
nation generally. Moreover, in the years following the Framing, every 
single state, both original and newly admitted, established a system of 
selecting presidential electors based either directly or indirectly on the 
sentiments of state voters. At no point in our nation’s history has any 
state sought to appoint its electors on the basis of voter sentiment outside 
the state, let alone the national popular vote. The Constitution’s 
delegation of power to the state legislature must therefore be read in light 
of this uniform, uncontested understanding that states are required to 
select electors in accordance with popular sentiment of voters in the state 
or the districts within it. 
While this conclusion may strike many as counterintuitive, a detailed 
examination of American constitutional history as it relates to 
presidential elections demonstrates its veracity. Part I briefly describes 
the presidential election process, the criticism of it, and how the NPVC 
seeks to transform the process. Part II then explores the debates at the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787, revealing that the framers expressly 
rejected the direct popular election of the President and instead settled on 
the Electoral College as a way to preserve the influence of the states, 
particularly smaller states, in the selection of the President. Significantly, 
this Part establishes that the framers expected state legislatures to select 
electors in accordance with state sentiment, not a national popular vote. 
Confirming this expectation, Part III then canvasses the manner in which 
the states exercised their constitutional authority to select presidential 
electors in the first few elections following the ratification of the 
 
appoint their electors in any manner they see fit”); Mark Rush, Legal Portrait of the United States 
Presidential Election of 2008, 3 J. PARLIAMENTARY & POL. L. 81, 92 (2009) (characterizing the 
constitutional question as a “minor issue”). 
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Constitution. In fact, as this Part shows, although the states have 
experimented over time with different systems for selecting their 
electors, every single system ever employed has selected the electors 
based on the expression of support among state voters, not the voters of 
the nation at large. 
Building upon this history, Part IV then explores the ramifications 
for the constitutionality of the NPVC. As this history suggests, the 
requirement that states appoint electors committed to the candidate who 
won the national popular vote exceeds the power delegated to the states 
under Article II, Section 1. Moreover, even if the historical evidence 
were not so clear, considerations of constitutional structure likewise 
counsel against reading Article II in the broad manner that proponents of 
the NPVC do. If a majority of states have the power to select electors on 
any basis, there is nothing to stop a majority of states from agreeing to 
appoint electors committed to candidates only from those states or, more 
ominously, from one political party. The same reasons that would 
condemn the validity of such regionalist or partisan compacts likewise 
condemn the NPVC. 
In short, whether or not one believes that the current system of 
electing the President should be changed, the NPVC is the wrong way to 
go about such reform. Indeed, it is a manifestly unconstitutional way to 
undertake it. 
I. ELECTING THE PRESIDENT13 
A. The Current Process 
As the U.S. Supreme Court pointedly reminded the American people 
in Bush v. Gore,14 the President is not elected by the people but rather by 
electors appointed by the states—the so-called “Electoral College.” The 
framers adopted this system of indirect election to provide the President 
with a degree of independence from Congress. Were the President 
selected by Congress—the principal alternative to the Electoral College 
considered by the framers—the framers feared that he would be too 
dependent on Congress and that potential candidates for the office would 
seek congressional support by making undesirable, if not downright 
 
 13. Several sections of this Part’s summary of the presidential-election process, most notably 
its description of the current process and how the National Popular Vote Compact seeks to change it, 
are borrowed from an earlier article of mine. See Williams, supra note 9. 
 14. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). 
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corrupt, promises in return for such support.15 Moreover, further 
reflecting the “Great Compromise” in which legislative power was split 
between the popularly apportioned House of Representatives and 
federally apportioned Senate, the framers specified in the Constitution 
that each state receives electors equal in number to the representatives 
and senators that state possesses in Congress.16 
The Constitution leaves it to each state to determine how its electors 
are selected, specifying that the electors shall be appointed by each state 
“in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.”17 Although 
many state legislatures originally appointed the electors directly, by the 
mid-1830s, all but one state (South Carolina) had moved to a system of 
holding popular elections to select the electors.18 Relatedly, while states 
at first used different electoral systems—some states used an at-large 
system that effectively gave all the state’s electors to the winning 
candidate, others used a district system, while still others used a 
combination of both the at-large and district systems—all of the states 
ultimately adopted the at-large system.19 
In actuality, the at-large system was not a true “winner-take-all” 
system because citizens still voted for individual electors, which could 
result in some voters, intentionally or not, selecting electors who 
supported different candidates.20 In the twentieth century, states moved 
to a true winner-take-all system with the adoption of the so-called “short 
ballot,” which removed the electors’ names from the ballot and listed 
only the presidential and vice presidential tickets. With the short ballot, 
regardless of the number of electors possessed by the state, citizens 
would cast only one vote for the presidential and vice-presidential ticket 
of their choice; the state would then award the winning ticket all of that 
state’s electors.21 Today, all states use the short ballot,22 and all but two 
 
 15. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 69 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter Farrand, RECORDS]. 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. By virtue of the Twenty-third Amendment, the District of 
Columbia participates in the presidential election and receives three electors. U.S. CONST. amend. 
XXIII. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
 18. WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 2. South Carolina’s legislature continued to 
appoint the state’s electors until after the Civil War. Id. 
 19. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1892). 
 20. Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 161. For example, in 1912, California voters elected 
eleven Progressive and two Democratic electors, and, in 1916, West Virginia voters elected seven 
Republican and one Democratic elector. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-6-23 (2007) (“When electors for the President and Vice-
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states use this winner-take-all system. The two exceptions, Maine and 
Nebraska, award their two “senatorial” electors to the winner of the 
statewide election, but, in each state, the voters in each congressional 
district select an elector for that district. As a result, the presidential 
candidates can split the electors from those states, as took place in 
Nebraska in 2008.23 
As most Americans understand, the general election takes place in 
early November. That date, however, is not specified in the Constitution 
but rather has been set by Congress by statute. Congress has set the 
Tuesday after the first Monday in November as the date on which the 
general election must take place.24 The presidential electors, in turn, cast 
their vote on the first Monday after the second Wednesday in 
December.25 By virtue of the Twelfth Amendment, each elector casts 
two votes, one for President and one for Vice President.26 
Although by tradition American political scientists and constitutional 
commentators refer to it as a “college,” the Electoral College never meets 
as one body. Unlike Congress or other representative institutions, the 
Electoral College was not conceived as a deliberative body in which the 
electors would discuss and debate the relative merits of the candidates. 
Rather, the framers feared that, were all the electors to assemble in one 
place, they would engage in vote-swapping and collusion.27 To prevent 
that eventuality, the framers specified in the Constitution that the electors 
 
President of the United States are to be elected, the names of the candidates for President and Vice-
President shall be listed on the ballot, but not the names of the electors.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
644(B) (2011) (“The qualified voter at a presidential election shall mark the square preceding the 
names and party designation for his choice of candidates for President and Vice President. His ballot 
so marked shall be counted as if he had marked squares preceding the names of the individual 
electors affiliated with his choice for President and Vice President.”). 
 22. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 56. 
 23. Barack Obama lost the state of Nebraska (and two of its three congressional districts) but 
won a majority of support in one of the state’s congressional districts, thereby giving him one of 
Nebraska’s five electoral votes. 
 24. 3 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 25. Id. § 7. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. As originally enacted, the Constitution specified that the 
electors would cast two votes, but the electors could not designate which person they favored as 
President versus Vice President. As a result, in the 1800 election, Democratic-Republican electors 
cast the same number of votes for Thomas Jefferson and his running mate Aaron Burr, which 
deprived the former of an Electoral College majority and sent the election to the House of 
Representatives (which only selected Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballot). That election ultimately 
prompted the passage of the Twelfth Amendment. 
 27. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 500; THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412–13 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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for each state should meet in their respective states.28 The framers further 
envisioned that the electors would be sage, independent men capable of 
evaluating the relative merits of the candidates and that, when separated 
into their various states, they would determine who among the 
presidential aspirants was best qualified in intellect and temperament to 
lead the nation.29 
Not surprisingly, the post-Framing-era rise of party politics has 
produced a presidential election system much unlike that envisioned by 
the framers. Far from being elite political sages, the presidential electors 
are almost invariably dedicated partisans, usually prominent officials in 
the state party apparatus who can be trusted to vote for the presidential 
candidate of their party. As a result, while there have been a handful of 
instances in which a “faithless elector” voted for some other candidate,30 
party loyalty typically ensures that the electors ultimately cast their vote 
for the candidate to which they are pledged.31 Since 1796, there have 
been only ten faithless electors out of the over 20,000 electors, and none 
of those faithless electors affected the outcome of the election.32 Hence, 
as a practical matter, the popular vote in each state conclusively 
determines which candidate receives that state’s electoral votes. It is for 
that reason that Americans typically know who has won the presidential 
election the night of the general election; no one waits with bated breath 
for the Electoral College ballots to be counted, even though it is that act, 
not the popular vote, that has constitutional significance. 
While the Electoral College’s vote may be a formality, it is a 
formality that is and must be performed. After the electors cast their 
ballots in mid-December, the ballots are transmitted to Congress, which 
opens and counts the votes in early January.33 To be elected President 
and Vice President, the winning candidates must receive a majority of 
the electoral votes of all the states. In the event that no candidate receives 
 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3; see also 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (specifying that electors shall 
meet at a location in the state designated by the legislature thereof). 
 29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 412–13 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961). 
 30. Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 147 & n.18; WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 
10. 
 31. Some states legally bind the electors to support the candidate to which they are pledged. 
WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 9. The constitutionality of such provisions is hotly contested. 
Id. at 10 & n.47; cf. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (upholding requirement that elector pledge to 
support party’s candidate but distinguishing laws that bound electors to so vote). 
 32. Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities: National Popular Vote and the Electoral College, 7 
ELECTION L.J. 196, 211 (2008). 
 33. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
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a majority, the election for President is thrown to the House of 
Representatives to determine the President from among the top three vote 
recipients in the Electoral College’s balloting.34 In the House’s voting, 
each state receives one vote with a majority of states necessary to elect 
the President. On only two occasions (1800 and 1824) has the election 
gone to the House under this contingent election procedure.35 
Today, there are 538 electors from the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia. As a result, a presidential candidate must receive 270 electors 
to be elected President. California has the most electors (fifty-five), while 
Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, and Vermont have the fewest (three). As a theoretical 
matter, a candidate could win the presidency by winning the top eleven 
most populous states, which collectively possess the bare minimum 270 
electoral votes. In actuality, since 1960 (the first election in a fifty-state 
union), no candidate has won the White House with less than twenty-two 
states, which John F. Kennedy did in 1960.36 
B. The Criticism of the Electoral College 
As the foregoing summary indicates, for well over a century, people 
in every state have voted in the presidential election.37 Moreover, with 
just a few exceptions, the electors selected by the people have faithfully 
voted the electorate’s preferences.38 Hence, while in form the Electoral 
College serves as a political intermediary between the people and the 
President, in practice, the votes of the people are transmitted almost 
automatically into electoral votes. In short, the popular provenance of the 
electors, coupled with the faithful transmittal of electoral preferences by 
 
 34. If no vice-presidential candidate receives a majority, the Senate elects the Vice President 
from among the top two vote recipients. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. There has been one election in 
which the election of the Vice President was thrown to the Senate. In 1836, Martin Van Buren’s 
running mate, Richard Johnson, failed to receive the necessary majority (because Virginia’s electors 
balked at his qualifications), but the Senate ultimately elected him anyway. 
 35. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEIRCe, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER 30–31 
(1996). 
 36. Id. at 46–48. Two additional states, Alabama and Mississippi, went Democratic in the 
voting, but more voters in those states, protesting the national party’s civil-rights platform, favored 
unpledged Democratic electors rather than electors pledged to the Democratic nominee John F. 
Kennedy. The unpledged electors ultimately voted for Sen. Harry Byrd. Id. at 57. 
 37. The last state to have its legislature appoint its electors was Colorado in 1876, which took 
place only because Colorado had been so recently admitted to the union as a state that its legislature 
did not have time to provide for a popular election for its presidential electors. McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 33 (1892). 
 38. See Smith, supra note 32, at 211. 
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the electors themselves, has fatally undermined any suggestion that the 
Electoral College is antidemocratic.39 The President is truly elected by 
the people. 
The principal charge against the Electoral College is that it is 
antimajoritarian.40 Specifically, the controversy surrounding the 
Electoral College has centered upon the allocation of political power 
among the people in the states resulting from the fact that electors are 
allocated on a state-by-state basis, with each state receiving the number 
of electors corresponding to its number of representatives and senators. 
This allocation of electors departs from the majoritarian ideal in two 
ways. First, because of indivisible population variances among the states, 
the number of representatives allocated to each state does not map 
perfectly with the population of the states. Both Missouri and Minnesota, 
for example, have eight representatives (and therefore ten electors), but 
Missouri has at least 684,000 more inhabitants than Minnesota.41 
Second, because each state receives two senatorial electors regardless of 
its population, less populous states receive more electors than a strict, 
population-based allocation would produce. Wyoming, for example, has 
three electors for its 563,000 residents (or one for every 187,600 
residents in the state), while California has fifty-five electors for its 
thirty-seven million-plus residents (or one for every 677,000 residents).42 
If electors were apportioned strictly on the basis of population, Wyoming 
would have only one elector, while California would have sixty-five. 
The critics seize on this apportionment of electors and point to the 
fact that, as a consequence, the Electoral College can elect a President 
 
 39. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rising Above Principle, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 153, 165 (1986). 
Some commentators continue to decry the College as “antidemocratic.” See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, 
Post-Originalism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1110 (2001). That is a misnomer, however. The 
substance of the commentators’ criticism—that the Electoral College does not guarantee the election 
of the candidate with the most votes—suggests that their concern is more properly viewed as one of 
antimajoritarianism than antidemocracy. Cf. Brannon P. Denning, Publius for All of Us, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 75, 85 (2009) (distinguishing between charges that the Electoral College is anti-
democratic versus anti-majoritarian and declaring that latter is “more precise”); Sanford Levinson, 
How the United States Constitution Contributes to the Democratic Deficit in America, 55 DRAKE L. 
REV. 859, 868, 876–77 (2007) (arguing that the Electoral College does not respect majority vote and 
noting that the antidemocratic charge is synonymous with an antimajoritarian charge). 
 40. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 16–17; James A. Gardner, Forcing States to Be Free: The 
Emerging Constitutional Guarantee of Radical Democracy, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1467, 1494 (2003); 
Levinson, supra note 39, at 868–69. 
 41. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS (2011), available at http://2010.census 
.gov/2010census/data/apportionment-pop-text.php. 
 42. See id. 
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who lost the nationwide popular vote. As evidence, the critics allege the 
Electoral College has “misfired” at least three times in our history.43 In 
1876, Republican Rutherford Hayes won a bare majority of Electoral 
College votes, even though Democrat Samuel Tilden received 250,000 
more popular votes. In 1888, Republican Benjamin Harrison received a 
substantial majority of electoral votes, despite the fact that Democrat 
Grover Cleveland received 91,000 more popular votes. Most recently, in 
2000, Republican George W. Bush won a bare majority of electoral 
votes, while Democrat Albert Gore received over half a million more 
popular votes nationwide.44 In the critics’ view, the Electoral College is 
therefore a threat to American democracy; even though the people vote, 
the Electoral College so distorts the manner in which their votes are 
aggregated that the loser may actually win. For this reason, the critics 
urge that, like legislative appointment of U.S. senators, the Electoral 
College should be discarded in favor of the direct popular election of the 
President.45 
To be sure, throughout American history, there have been many 
efforts to reform or eliminate the Electoral College, but all have failed. 
Of the 11,000 constitutional amendments proposed in Congress, over 
1,000 have dealt with the Electoral College, and many of those have 
sought to implement a direct popular election.46 In the most recent 
 
 43. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 16–18; NEIL R. PEIRCE & LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY, THE 
PEOPLE’S PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT VOTE 
ALTERNATIVE 116 (1981).  
 44. Peter M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-For-Hostages, 
“Orderly Shutdowns,” Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial “Coups”, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 503, 538 (2003) (“Gore lost not because we have an electoral college, but because we have an 
electoral college that is so profoundly malapportioned.”). The election of 1824 is also sometimes 
listed as an example of an election of a minority President, but the circumstances of that election 
cloud the picture. E.g., KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 16. Four strong candidates (John Quincy 
Adams, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and William Crawford) split the Electoral College vote, 
sending the election for the second and last time to the House of Representatives. The House 
ultimately selected Adams, even though Jackson had won more votes. Three points distinguish this 
election from the others. First, it was the House, not the Electoral College, that selected the President 
(and it is therefore the House who deserves the blame, if any). Second, the four candidates had split 
the popular vote too, such that Jackson received only forty-one percent of the popular vote. Third, 
and most importantly, six states, including the populous state of New York, which heavily favored 
Adams over the three Southern candidates, did not conduct a popular election and instead used 
legislative appointment for their presidential electors. It is simply impossible to know whether 
Adams lost the nationwide popular vote because there was none. 
 45. Levinson, supra note 39, at 868. 
 46. Thomas E. Cronin, Foreword to JUDITH BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE? DEBATING 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE viii (1996); Chang, supra note 11, at 210. 
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Congress, there was one bill proposing a constitutional amendment to 
eliminate the Electoral College and move to a direct popular election, but 
it went nowhere.47 Article V, though, imposes a high threshold for 
amendments: a proposed amendment must pass both houses of Congress 
by a two-thirds vote and then be ratified by three-quarters of the states.48 
In 1969, the House passed such an amendment, but it failed to secure the 
necessary two-thirds majority in the Senate.49 In 1979, the Senate 
rejected a similar amendment by a vote of fifty-one to forty-eight.50 
Since then, other proposed amendments abolishing the Electoral College 
have died without floor action.51 Popular support for constitutional 
reform, it seems, is widespread but shallow. 
C. The National Popular Vote Compact 
In the wake of the 2000 presidential election, several critics of the 
Electoral College came up with a clever way to circumvent the Electoral 
College without, in their view, at least, the need for a constitutional 
amendment. Recognizing that the Constitution assigns to the state 
legislatures the power to direct the manner in which each state’s electors 
are selected, these critics imagined that each state could decide on its 
own to award all of its electors to the candidate who won the nationwide 
popular vote. Of course, were only one or two individual states to do so, 
there would be no guarantee that their adoption of such an appointment 
system would ensure that the candidate who won the popular vote would 
win the Electoral College vote.52 At the same time, there could be 
substantial domestic political costs for states that unilaterally adopted 
such a system. Without the guarantee that the popular vote winner would 
actually prevail nationwide, few states would relish appointing electors 
pledged to the candidate who lost that state’s poll. 
 
 47. H.R.J. Res. 36, 112th Cong. (2011). The resolution was referred to the House Judiciary 
Committee, which in turn referred it to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, where no further 
action on it was taken. 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. V. Amendments may also be proposed by a national convention, but that 
mechanism has never been used. 
 49. Levinson, supra note 4, at 222. 
 50. 125 CONG. REC. 17766 (1979). 
 51. WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 4, at 15; Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 150. 
 52. One of the critics, law professor Robert Bennett, disagrees. Bennett argues that even if 
one or two large states decided to unilaterally adopt such an appointment process, the number of 
electors controlled by those states would make it nearly impossible for a candidate who lost the 
popular vote to amass an Electoral College majority out of the remaining states. Bennett, supra note 
6, at 244. 
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Appreciating this collective-action problem, the proponents 
developed the idea of an interstate compact among the states. Under the 
terms of this proposed National Popular Vote Compact, each state agrees 
to hold a statewide popular election for President, as every state already 
does.53 After the election, each signatory state’s chief election official 
determines the number of votes cast for each presidential–vice 
presidential slate of candidates in her state and communicates those 
numbers to all other states’ chief election officials.54 Once all of the 
statewide popular election vote totals are ascertained and the national 
popular vote winner determined, the compact requires that each signatory 
state appoint the slate of electors committed to the candidate who won 
the national popular vote, regardless whether that candidate won that 
particular state’s own poll.55 
For a measure that seeks to profoundly alter the manner in which the 
nation’s chief executive is selected, the NPVC is otherwise surprisingly 
brief and cursory. To address the collective-action problem, the compact 
provides that it will not go into effect until states comprising a majority 
of the Electoral College sign on.56 In that way, there is no obligation for 
a state to appoint electors contrary to its own voters’ will until such time 
it can be sure that, in so doing, the national popular vote winner will 
secure the presidency thereby. To prevent states from triggering the 
implementation of the NPVC late in the presidential campaign, the 
NPVC governs only presidential elections in which the requisite college 
of states has ratified the NPVC by July 20
 
of the election year. 
Correspondingly, to prevent strategic defections by individual states late 
in the election cycle, the compact also specifies that a signatory state 
may withdraw from the compact only if it does so before July 20 in a 
presidential election year.57 As to other important aspects of the election 
process, such as the conduct of the election in the states, the counting of 
 
 53. AGREEMENT AMONG THE STATES TO ELECT THE PRESIDENT BY NATIONWIDE VOTE, art. 
II [hereinafer AGREEMENT], available at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/ pages/misc/888word 
compact.php. 
 54. Id. art. III. Moreover, to instill public confidence in the counting of ballots, the official 
must make public those vote totals “as they are determined or obtained.” Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. art. IV. 
 57. Id. If a state attempts to withdraw after that date, the compact purports to bind the state 
through the upcoming presidential election. The legal and practical problems with enforcing that 
requirement are discussed in Williams, supra note 9, at 216–22. 
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ballots, or the triggering and manner of conducting recounts, the 
proposed compact is silent.58 
Proponents of the NPVC believe that it will fundamentally transform 
American presidential elections. In their view, once the compact goes 
into effect, the presidential election would become solely the product of 
the nationwide popular vote; whether a candidate won a particular state, 
such as Florida in 2000, would be irrelevant. Indeed, supporters hope that 
even those states that refused to sign on to the compact would find 
themselves powerless to produce a victory for any other candidate.59 By 
virtue of their Electoral College majority, the signatory states’ pledge to 
appoint their electors to the national popular vote winner would be 
conclusive. The NPVC supporters also hope that its passage will change 
the nature of presidential campaigns. In their view, a few select swing 
states (such as Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Florida) currently receive too 
much attention from the presidential candidates, while “safe” states (such 
as California and New York for the Democrats and Texas and the South 
for the Republicans) receive too little.60 By eliminating the importance 
of winning individual states, proponents of the NPVC believe that 
candidates will spend more time in other states, attempting to increase 
their national vote margins. 
As of February 2012, eight states, including the electoral behemoth 
California, with its fifty-five electoral votes, and the District of Columbia 
have adopted the NPVC.61 Those states collectively possess 132 
electoral votes, almost half of the electoral votes necessary for the NPVC 
to go into effect. Moreover, supporters are confident that political 
momentum is building in their favor. The NPVC has been passed in one 
or both houses of the legislature in a number of states.62 Together, those 
states comprise an additional 111 electoral votes. If those states ratified 
the NPVC, it would be only thirty-two electoral votes short of 
ratification. Based on these expressions of popular support, proponents 
of the NPVC hope that the NPVC will gather the requisite number of 
states to be in effect for the 2016 presidential election.63 
 
 58. AGREEMENT, supra note 53, art. IV. 
 59. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 247. 
 60. See, e.g., id. at xxix; Chang, supra note 11, at 218–19. 
 61. Those states are California, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii, 
Vermont, and Washington. 
 62. The Connecticut House, for example, approved the NPVC on May 11, 2009. 
 63. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 281. 
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D. Criticism of the NPVC 
As might be expected, the NPVC itself has attracted a great deal of 
academic interest. For many critics of the current Electoral College-
based system, such as Akhil Amar and Robert Bennett, the NPVC offers 
a welcomed way to usher in the direct popular election of the 
President.64 For others, however, the NPVC is a dangerous run around 
the constitutional requirement that any change in the presidential election 
process be accomplished by constitutional amendment. 
Criticism of the NPVC falls into two, broad camps. First, many 
critics contest the desirability of the NPVC from a policy standpoint. In a 
prior article, I identified several problems with the NPVC.65 Among 
other shortcomings, the NPVC permits the election of a President with a 
bare plurality of the popular vote; it fails to provide for a nationwide 
recount in the case of a close election; it fails to address the electoral and 
constitutional crisis if one or more states obstruct the calculation of a 
national popular vote or withdraw from the compact on the eve of—or 
worse, shortly after—the general election; and, finally, by virtue of the 
differences among the states with regard to each other’s electoral rules 
and procedures, the NPVC simply substitutes one form of 
malapportionment for another. While the current system ostensibly 
favors citizens in small states, the NPVC would favor citizens in those 
states with generous election rules and procedures. 
Second, several critics contest the constitutionality of the NPVC. To 
date, these critics have founded their arguments on the Compact Clause 
of Article I, Section 10, which provides that no state may “enter into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State” without Congress’s 
consent.66 Despite this seemingly categorical language which forbids 
states from “enter[ing] into any Agreement or Compact” with another 
state absent Congress’s consent, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that some interstate agreements do not qualify as 
compacts and therefore do not require congressional consent.67 Seizing 
 
 64. See Bennett, supra note 5; Amar & Amar, supra note 5. 
 65. See Williams, supra note 9. 
 66. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 67. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 469 (1978); Virginia 
v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893) (“Looking at the clause in which the terms ‘compact’ or 
‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination 
tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with 
the just supremacy of the United States.”). 
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upon this line of cases, proponents of the NPVC argue that congressional 
consent is not required to make the NPVC valid.68 
While I am sympathetic to the critics’ constitutional claims, the 
Compact Clause strikes me as of secondary importance. After all, 
implicit in the critics’ argument is that Congress could validate the 
NPVC by consenting to it. In my view, that concession is unwarranted 
for a reason unrelated to the Compact Clause. Rather, in my view, 
whether or not the Compact Clause requires Congress’s consent to the 
NPVC, the NPVC is unconstitutional because it violates Article II of the 
Constitution. Given the seemingly categorical language of Article II, 
which provides that the manner of selecting presidential electors is left to 
the discretion of each state’s legislature,69 such a claim may at first blush 
seem improbable. Nevertheless, there is good reason to read the language 
of Article II more narrowly than do the proponents of the NPVC. In 
particular, the history of the adoption of Article II and its use by state 
legislatures in the past two centuries evince that, while states have the 
authority to appoint electors based on the results of a statewide or district 
election, they cannot appoint electors based on election results in other 
states. 
II. THE ADOPTION OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
To be sure, the Electoral College was not the product of some highly 
theorized conception of executive power. Nor was it the result of the 
framers copying and paying homage to an institutional construct whose 
bona fides had been demonstrated by time and experience. Indeed, unlike 
the new Congress, which followed upon the Continental and 
Confederation Congresses, the new presidency had no precursor in the 
colonial- or Confederation-era government, which lacked a national 
executive. While the framers could draw some lessons from the 
experience of the states, each of which had a chief executive, that lesson 
was primarily negative in character, illustrating what the new national 
government should avoid, not what it should emulate. The Revolution-
era state constitutions, which had been drafted in response to the fears of 
replicating the abusive royal governors of colonial times, either provided 
for a popularly elected governor with a short term of office, sometimes 
no more than one year in length, or more typically vested the selection of 
the governor in the legislature, which made the former dependent upon 
 
 68. KOZA ET AL., supra note 6, at 439–45. 
 69. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. 
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and therefore ultimately subservient to the latter.70 As a result, the 
Confederation-era state governors were an enfeebled lot, lacking the 
energy and independence that the framers fervently wished the new 
federal executive to possess. 
In a very real sense, the framers who convened in Philadelphia in the 
summer of 1787 were writing upon a blank slate. Ultimately, the 
decision to vest the selection of the new President in an Electoral College 
was embraced by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
not because anyone thought it was the best way to elect the President, but 
because it was preferable to the two primary alternatives: direct election 
by the people or appointment by Congress. As historian Jack Rakove 
accurately observed, the establishment of the Electoral College “owed 
more to the perceived defects in alternative modes of election than to any 
great confidence that this ingenious mechanism would work in 
practice.”71 For the framers, the Electoral College was a second-best 
solution. 
Before condemning the framers for their lack of imagination, 
however, it is first necessary to understand the political forces that led 
the framers to embrace the Electoral College over the alternatives. And 
to do that, it is first critical to situate the debate over the process of 
selecting the President within the more fundamental political battle that 
divided the Constitutional Convention regarding the status and role of the 
states in the new national political union. Only after one appreciates the 
contours of that more fundamental battle over the nature of the union and 
the closely intertwined issue regarding the representative structure of the 
new Congress can one begin to appreciate the forces that led the framers 
to settle upon an institution that, to modern eyes at least, is a political 
anachronism. 
 
 70. Of the twelve states represented at the Constitutional Convention, eight of them had 
legislatively appointed governors. DEL. CONST. art. VII (1776); GA. CONST. art. II (1777); N.C. 
CONST. art. XV (1776); N.J. CONST. art. VII (1776); PA. CONST. ch. II, art. XIX (1776); S.C. CONST. 
art. III (1778). Only Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York, and New Hampshire had a popularly 
elected executive. See CONN. CHARTER (1662) (popularly elected for one-year term); MASS. CONST. 
pt. 2, ch. II, art. III (1780) (popularly elected for one-year term); N.H. CONST. pt. II (1784) 
(popularly elected for one-year term); N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, XVIII (1777) (popularly elected for 
three-year term). 
 71. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 267 (1996). See also PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra 
note 43, at 22 (noting that the Electoral College was “the second choice of many delegates”). 
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A. The Nature of the Union 
As its name suggested, the Articles of Confederation established a 
loose confederation among the thirteen states that declared and then won 
their independence from Great Britain in the Revolutionary War. Under 
the terms of the Articles, each state was a sovereign entity that stood on 
equal political footing with the other states in the confederation.72 As 
such, each state received one vote in the Confederation Congress, 
regardless of its population.73 Not surprisingly, the large, populous 
states, such as Virginia and Pennsylvania, resented this system, which 
gave Virginia the same political power in the Congress as Rhode Island 
or Georgia. Even worse, alterations to the Articles required the 
unanimous consent of all the states, thereby empowering a single state to 
veto proposed changes endorsed by the other states. 
In the years following the Revolution, the Confederation Congress 
found itself woefully unable to protect the new nation’s interests abroad 
or to respond to emerging challenges at home. The Confederation 
Congress’s failings were numerous, but most notable among them was 
its inability to raise funds to retire the Revolutionary War debt and to 
provide a uniform system of taxation and regulation for interstate and 
foreign commerce. Strikingly, the Articles of Confederation did not 
authorize Congress to lay taxes directly upon the people but rather left 
Congress in the untenable position of requisitioning funds from the state 
legislatures.74 When Congress made such requisitions, states often failed 
to comply with them.75 In response, Congress asked the states several 
times to consent to amendments to the Articles to vest Congress with the 
authority to lay its own duties on foreign imports, but the proposals were 
vetoed first by Rhode Island and then later by New York.76 At the same 
time, and relatedly, the Confederation government found itself powerless 
to establish a coherent policy with respect to foreign or interstate 
commerce, leaving American commercial interests subject to a disparate 
web of regulations and taxes adopted by the states. Without the power to 
lay a tax or regulate commerce, Congress found itself both financially 
 
 72. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II. 
 73. Id. art. V (allotting one vote per state). Interestingly, the Articles of Confederation 
described the Confederation as a “league of friendship” among the states. Id. art. III. 
 74. Id. art. VIII. 
 75. CALVIN H. JOHNSON, RIGHTEOUS ANGER AT THE WICKED STATES: THE MEANING OF 
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 15–16 (2005). 
 76. Id. at 26–29. 
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starved and constitutionally disabled from protecting the new nation’s 
emerging commercial interests. 
The manifest and apparent weakness of the Confederation Congress 
with respect to finances and commerce ultimately led to the 
Constitutional Convention that assembled in Philadelphia in May 1787. 
Though the Convention had been formally tasked merely with revising 
the Articles to establish a more robust national government capable of 
promoting American interests, many delegates saw the opportunity to use 
the Convention to bring about a more profound, fundamental change in 
the nature of the union. No one more clearly saw both the need for and 
the opportunity to undertake such a revolution in government than James 
Madison, who would play a critical role at the Constitutional Convention 
and ensuing ratification debates.77 In Madison’s view, the problem with 
the Confederation Congress was not merely that it lacked particular 
powers; rather, its dependence upon the states, particularly the state 
legislatures, ineluctably rendered it incapable of promoting the nation’s 
interests. In Madison’s view, the inherent parochialism of representatives 
deputized by and on behalf of the state governments would “never fail to 
render federal measures abortive.”78 
The Constitutional Convention convened in May 1787, and on May 
29, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph of Virginia introduced the so-
called “Virginia Plan.” Primarily the work of Madison, the Virginia Plan 
reflected the profound ambitions of its author to remove the states from 
the center of the political galaxy that they occupied under the Articles of 
Confederation. Under the terms of the Virginia Plan, there would be a 
new national government composed of three separate branches. With 
respect to the legislative branch, the Confederation Congress would be 
replaced with a bicameral Congress apportioned on the basis of state 
population.79 With the least populous state entitled to at least one 
representative, the Virginia Plan was not entirely majoritarian—
representatives would be assigned on a state-by-state basis which would 
inevitably lead to some variances in population among congressional 
delegations from different states—but its underlying political theory was 
one in which political power tracked population. Moreover, in further 
contrast to the Articles of Confederation, the Virginia Plan specified that 
 
 77. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 472–73 
(1998). 
 78. 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 352 (Robert Rutland et al. eds., 1975). 
 79. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 20–21. 
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members of the lower house of the new Congress would be elected 
directly by the people.80 The members of the upper house, in turn, were 
to be selected by the lower house from a list of candidates nominated by 
the states.81 Unlike the Confederation Congress, the state legislatures 
would not control the selection of the members of either house of 
Congress. 
The Virginia Plan was a direct assault upon the notion that each state 
was a political equal of the others, and it was understood as such not only 
by its supporters but, equally importantly, by its opponents in the smaller 
states, such as Delaware. Delegates from the smaller states viewed the 
Virginia Plan—correctly—as a threat to their political influence in the 
new Congress. In response, on June 15, they put forth the so-called “New 
Jersey Plan.” Their plan followed the Virginia Plan in creating a tripartite 
national government, but it preserved the pre-existing political structure 
of the Confederation-era Congress. Although Congress’s powers would 
be enlarged, it would remain a one-house assembly in which each state 
received an equal vote and whose members would be selected by the 
state legislatures.82 
Proponents of each plan viewed the other scheme not only as a threat 
to their own state’s interests but as fundamentally inconsistent with the 
political foundation of the new union. For proponents of the Virginia 
Plan, the new Constitution would create a new national government that 
derived its power not from the states but from the people directly. As 
such, the new Congress would be elected by the people to represent the 
people. As a corollary to this conception of the new union, the number of 
representatives necessarily had to be based on population so as to ensure 
equality of political power among the people. As James Madison, the 
author of the Virginia Plan, boldly asserted, “whatever reason might have 
existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one 
among sovereign States, it must cease when a national Govern[ment] 
should be put into place.”83 In contrast, for proponents of the New Jersey 
Plan, the new union was to be very much like the old, consisting of a 
confederation of sovereign, coequal states. As such, each state was 
entitled to equal representation in the new Congress. 
 
 80. Id. at 20. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 242–45. See also RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 63. 
 83. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 37. 
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With the divide between the two sides based on deep theoretical 
disagreement about the nature of the union and the status of the states in 
it, the Constitutional Convention threatened to stalemate. The New 
Jersey Plan was rejected overwhelmingly,84 but the delegates’ opposition 
to the smaller states’ gambit did not translate into support for the 
competing Virginia Plan.85 When delegates from the larger states 
attempted to capitalize on the defeat of the New Jersey Plan, it became 
apparent that there was substantial support for some alternative 
formulation that would protect the smaller states’ political influence in 
the new Congress. On June 29, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut proposed 
that each state be given an equal vote in the upper house.86 That proposal 
was initially defeated on a tie vote,87 but the closeness of the vote itself 
demonstrated both the lack of substantial support for the Virginia Plan 
and the fact that the delegates increasingly knew the contours of the 
ultimate compromise between the larger and smaller states that would be 
necessary. 
The logjam was broken with the introduction on July 5 of the “Great 
Compromise,” drafted by a committee specially charged to find a middle 
ground that could appease both the larger and smaller states.88 Also 
known as the “Connecticut Plan” because of its similarity to Ellsworth’s 
proposal, the proposed compromise would create a bicameral Congress. 
The lower house would be elected by the people of the individual states, 
with each state receiving the number of representatives based on its 
population.89 Meanwhile, as Ellsworth had proposed just a week earlier, 
the upper house would maintain the Confederation Congress’s system of 
equal political representation of the states. In an effort to mollify the 
larger states, the proposal specified that appropriation bills could only 
 
 84. Id. at 313. 
 85. RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 65. 
 86. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 468, 474. 
 87. Id. at 509. 
 88. Id. at 524–25. 
 89. Id. The representative nature of the lower house, like much of the Constitution, was 
compromised by the issue of slavery. As the new national government was understood to have the 
power to assess a direct tax upon the property of the various states, Southern states demanded that 
slaves be included in the calculation of their representation. Northern states were not prepared to 
give the white Southerners political influence based on disenfranchised, enslaved persons. Hence, 
the Convention used a compromise first made in the Confederation Congress with respect to a 
proposed national tax: slaves would be treated as three-fifths of a person for purposes of calculating 
a state’s allocation of representatives in the lower house. 
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originate in the lower house. Even with the appropriation provision,90 the 
larger states had significant misgivings about the proposal. Nevertheless, 
the discussion over the past month and a half had shown that the smaller 
states would never agree to the Virginia Plan. On July 16, the delegates 
narrowly approved the Great Compromise.91 
The change in representation in the upper house profoundly altered 
the character of the new Congress. The delegates had previously agreed 
that members of the upper house would not be selected by the lower 
house, as Randolph had originally proposed, but rather selected by the 
state legislatures.92 Coupled with state legislative appointment, the 
change in representation ensured that the upper house would provide a 
lasting echo of the old Confederation Congress as a forum in which the 
states would be represented as equal, corporate bodies. As such, the 
Great Compromise wrought a fundamental transformation in the nature 
of the new union. The new Constitution did not establish an omnipotent 
national government in which the states played no formal role. Nor did it 
maintain a federal league in which the states played the central role. 
Rather, the new Constitution blended elements of both, with the new 
bicameral Congress reflecting the composite nature of the new union. As 
James Madison writing as Publius in the Federalist Papers would later 
characterize it, the new Constitution was “neither a national nor a federal 
Constitution, but a composition of both.”93 
The battle over the status of the states and their role in the new 
Congress was obviously important in its own right, but it also played a 
crucial part in the debates over the new presidency. No feature of the 
new government was considered in isolation, divorced from 
consideration as to how it would interact with other features. Hence, 
changes made by the framers with respect to one element would often 
produce “downstream” consequences regarding their approach to other 
features of the new government. So too it was with respect to the 
relationship between the Senate and the presidency. The smaller states 
had won a victory in preserving their political influence in the new 
 
 90. Madison, in particular, dismissed the “origination” provision as pointless since the Senate 
could simply refuse to pass appropriation bills with which it disagreed. Id. at 527. 
 91. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 13–14. 
 92. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 149. 
 93. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Oliver 
Ellsworth had similarly defended his proposal to maintain the equal suffrage of the states in the 
upper house in these terms, arguing that the new Congress would be “partly national; partly federal.” 
1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 468. 
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Senate, but their perceived influence profoundly shaped the framers’ 
deliberations regarding the process for selecting the President. 
B. The Presidency 
The issue of presidential selection had arisen at the very outset of the 
Convention. The Virginia Plan had proposed that the President be 
selected by Congress to serve for a single term of seven years.94 Given 
the fact of legislative appointment, the limitation to one term was an 
important one. In those states in which the governor was selected by the 
legislature, the desire to gain reappointment had made the governors 
unduly dependent on and subservient to the legislature in the framers’ 
eyes. The proponents of the Virginia Plan hoped that by rendering the 
President ineligible for a second term, he would possess the requisite 
independence from Congress. 
James Wilson of Pennsylvania opened the debate on the Virginia 
Plan by declaring his support for a popularly elected President. Wilson 
pointed to the experience in New York and Massachusetts, both of which 
had an elected governor, as proof that popular election was “a convenient 
and successful” method of selecting the executive.95 Popular election 
would also eliminate the President’s dependence on Congress for 
election. Strikingly, however, Wilson did not equate popular election 
with a direct vote by the people. When asked to transform his remarks 
into a formal proposal, Wilson moved that each state be divided into 
districts and that the citizens of each district elect a certain number of 
electors, who would then meet to elect the President.96 Here, then, was 
the first mention of a college of electors, and most notably, it was 
introduced to the Convention as a method for implementing, albeit 
indirectly, the popular election of the President. 
Unfortunately for Wilson, his proposal drew little support. Elbridge 
Gerry liked the quintessentially republican spirit of popular election, but 
he worried that the people were “too little informed” as to whom to 
select as electors and they would therefore be “liable to deceptions.”97 
Hugh Williamson, meanwhile, saw no difference between entrusting the 
 
 94. The plan as introduced left the number of years of the term of office blank. 1 Farrand, 
RECORDS, supra note 15, at 21. Almost immediately, however, the delegates filled in the blank with 
a term of seven years. Id. at 64. 
 95. Id. at 68. 
 96. Id. at 77, 80. 
 97. Id. at 80. 
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President’s selection to an electoral college and entrusting it to the state 
legislatures.98 Wilson’s proposal was overwhelmingly defeated.99 The 
Convention then immediately returned to the Virginia Plan’s proposal for 
a legislatively appointed President, which the Convention approved by 
an equally wide margin.100 
This early skirmish over the executive was significant in revealing 
the contours of the framers’ initial thoughts regarding the executive, but 
its importance should not be overstated. The delegates had rejected the 
notion of a President selected by the people, albeit selected indirectly via 
an electoral college. Instead, they had settled upon congressional 
appointment as the appropriate mode of selection. Yet, they continued to 
worry whether the President would be sufficiently independent of 
Congress, to whom he would owe his appointment. Moreover, because 
the very nature of Congress was itself the subject of intense, ongoing 
controversy among the delegates at this point in the Convention’s 
debates, this early approval of congressional appointment could be 
viewed as only tentative. Until the question of representation in Congress 
was settled, the issue of the President’s mode of selection remained open 
to reexamination. 
The debate over the presidency resumed in full force on July 17, the 
day after the passage of the Great Compromise. That debate, which 
lasted more than a week, revealed both the delegates’ dissatisfaction with 
congressional appointment of the executive and their inability to find a 
satisfactory alternative. 
Renewing the push for a popularly elected President, Gouverneur 
Morris proposed that the President be elected by “citizens of [the] 
U.S.”101 Unlike Wilson’s proposal of a month earlier, Morris’s eschewed 
the intermediating device of an electoral college and provided that the 
people would vote for the President directly. Despite its republican bona 
fides, Morris’s proposal drew substantial opposition. Roger Sherman 
protested that the people “will never be sufficiently informed of 
characters” to select the President and would therefore tend to support 
only “some man in their own State.”102 Similarly, George Mason argued 
that “[t]he extent of the Country renders it impossible that the people can 
 
 98. Id. at 81. 
 99. Id. The vote was eight states against and two in favor. 
 100. Id. at 77, 81. 
 101. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 29. 
 102. Id. 
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have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective pretensions of the 
Candidates.”103 Allowing the people to select the President was, 
according to Mason, akin to entrusting “a trial of colours to a blind 
man.”104 
More importantly for present purposes, several framers attacked the 
direct popular election of the President as too majoritarian. Charles 
Pinckney, for example, suggested that popular election would favor the 
more populous states, which could combine to elect a President of their 
own choosing.105 Hugh Williamson was even more adamant, declaring 
that “[t]he people will be sure to vote for some man in their own State, 
and the largest State will be sure to succede [sic].”106 These criticisms 
found their mark: Morris’s proposal for the direct popular election of the 
President was defeated nine states against to one in favor—a margin of 
defeat even worse than that for the indirect popular election proposed a 
month earlier by Wilson.107 
At the same time, vesting the appointment of the President in 
Congress worried many of the delegates, who feared that a legislatively 
appointed President would be too dependent upon Congress. “If the 
Legislature elect,” Gouverneur Morris declared, “it will be the work of 
intrigue, of cabal, and of faction: it will be like the election of a pope by 
a conclave of cardinals.”108 Elaborating, Morris warned that “[i]f the 
Executive be chosen by the [National] Legislature, he will not be 
independent [of] it; and if not independent, usurpation & tyranny on the 
part of the Legislature will be the consequence.”109 
These concerns drew added force when the Convention voted to 
make the President eligible for reappointment. The Virginia Plan had 
made the President ineligible precisely so as to make him independent of 
Congress. Proponents of reappointment, however, argued that 
ineligibility sapped the executive of the interest and desire to work 
diligently on the nation’s behalf. As Gouverneur Morris put it, 
ineligibility “tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the 
hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment.”110 Congressional 
 
 103. Id. at 31. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 30. 
 106. Id. at 32. 
 107. Id. at 24, 32. Only Pennsylvania, James Wilson’s home state, supported the motion. 
 108. Id. at 29. 
 109. Id. at 31. 
 110. Id. at 33. 
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appointment, coupled with the possibility of reappointment, raised the 
specter of an executive fully dependent upon the Congress. Echoing 
Morris’s fears, Madison warned the Convention: 
If it be essential to the preservation of liberty that the Legisl[ative], 
Execut[ive], & Judicia[l] powers be separate, it is essential to a 
maintenance of the separation, that they should be independent of each 
other. The Executive could not be independent of the Legislature, if 
dependent on the pleasure of that branch for a re-appointment. Why 
was it determined that the Judges should not hold their places by such a 
tenure? Because they might be tempted to cultivate the Legislature, by 
an undue complaisance, and thus render the Legislature the virtual 
expositor, as well the maker of the laws. In like manner a dependence 
of the Executive on the Legislature, would render it the Executor as 
well as the maker of laws; and then according to the observation of 
Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed 
in a tyrannical manner.111 
The delegates found themselves on the horn of a dilemma. They 
wished the executive to be selected by some body of knowledgeable, 
patriotic individuals who could identify and evaluate worthy candidates; 
they wanted the executive to be energetic; and, finally, they wished him 
to be independent, capable of resisting congressional encroachments. 
None of the options that had been discussed, however, accomplished all 
three aims. The first pointed to legislative appointment, but to render the 
executive sufficiently independent required that he be limited to one 
term, which was thought to sap the office of its energy. Popular election 
with the possibility of reelection, on the other hand, would produce an 
independent, energetic executive, but the people could not be trusted to 
identify the most capable and wise characters, and, equally bad for 
delegates from the smaller states who had just fought to preserve their 
influence in the new Congress, a direct, nationwide popular election 
would favor the larger states over the smaller states. 
A possible solution to the dilemma was suggested first by Elbridge 
Gerry, who, reprising an idea first advanced by James Wilson a month 
earlier, suggested that the President be selected by a college of 
electors.112 Gerry preferred the electors to be chosen by the governors of 
each state, but there was no support for that option.113 Instead, seizing 
 
 111. Id. at 34. 
 112. Id. at 57. 
 113. Id. Gerry had suggested something very similar in early June, when he proposed that the 
President be chosen directly by the vote of the state governors, with each governor receiving the 
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upon Gerry’s proposal, Oliver Ellsworth suggested that each state receive 
between one and three electors depending on its population and that each 
state’s electors be chosen by the state legislature thereof.114 Though the 
allocation of electors was only weakly linked to each state’s population, 
the contours of the body that would become the Electoral College were 
becoming clearer. With little debate, Ellsworth’s proposal passed with 
substantial support.115 
Despite the delegates’ initial embrace of the Electoral College, 
dissatisfaction with it appeared almost immediately, prompting them to 
reconsider the matter. Several delegates worried that the position of 
elector was so insignificant that capable men would not seek the 
office.116 As Hugh Williamson tersely put it, the electors “would 
certainly not be men of the 1st nor even of the 2[nd] grade in the 
States.”117 These opponents then moved that the Electoral College be 
replaced—again—by legislative appointment by Congress, which 
passed, again, with substantial support.118 
The next few days were consumed in a tedious cycle of proposal–
criticism counterproposal–countercriticism that illuminated the 
delegates’ increasing frustration with their own inability to find a suitable 
formula for selecting the federal executive. James Wilson suggested that, 
to minimize the likelihood of intrigue and cabal, the President be selected 
by a handful of congressmen determined by lot and sequestered for the 
entirety of their deliberations until they selected a President.119 Oliver 
Ellsworth suggested that Congress appoint the President to his first term 
with reelection contingent on approval by a college of electors selected 
 
number of votes his state received in the Senate. 1 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 175. At the 
time, the representation of the Senate was deeply contested, but under the terms of the Virginia Plan 
then under discussion, the states’ representation in the Senate would be based on population. Gerry’s 
proposal failed unanimously, 10–0, with Delaware’s delegation divided. Id. at 175–76. 
 114. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 57. 
 115. There were two separate votes on Ellsworth’s motion. On the question whether the 
President be chosen by electors, there were six states in favor, three opposed, and one 
(Massachusetts) divided. Id. at 51. On the question whether the electors be chosen by the state 
legislatures, there were eight states in favor and two opposed. Id. The next day, the Convention 
approved a strict enumeration of electors to which each state was entitled “in the 1st instance,” or the 
first election of the President, leaving uncertain what would happen as state populations changed 
over time. Id. at 60–64. 
 116. Id. at 99, 100. 
 117. Id. at 100. 
 118. Id. at 101. 
 119. Id. at 103. Wilson acknowledged that his was not a “digested idea” and was therefore 
“liable to strong objections.” Id. 
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by the state legislatures.120 Charles Pinckney, in turn, advanced the idea 
that Congress select the President but that, rather than being eligible for 
immediate reelection, the President would be eligible for reelection at 
some later date, subject to the proviso that no President could serve more 
than six years in any twelve-year period.121 The increasing complexity of 
these proposals, all of which failed,122 demonstrated both the difficulty 
of the problem and the delegates’ desire to find some way to resolve the 
dilemma. George Mason summarized the views of many when he 
conceded that legislative appointment was liable to objections, but “it 
was liable to fewer than any other [mode of selection].”123 
The delegates’ begrudging consensus in favor of congressional 
appointment collapsed entirely during the process of hammering out the 
details as to exactly how Congress would perform that task—
specifically, whether the two houses of Congress would vote separately 
or by joint ballot. The former would give the smaller states, through their 
influence in the Senate, an effective veto over candidates favored by the 
larger states; the latter would give the larger states, through their 
influence in the House, substantial influence in the selection. As might 
be expected, the same divisions that had arisen during the debate over 
representation in Congress again manifested themselves. The delegates 
from the smaller states viewed the proposal for a joint ballot as a means 
to undo the Great Compromise.124 In response, delegates from the larger 
states warned of the “[g]reat delay and confusion” that would result if 
each House were required to agree on a candidate.125 
The proposal to conduct the vote by joint ballot passed,126 but 
dissatisfaction with the proposed system of selection by Congress was 
growing with each vote. In this respect, the course of debate was not 
symmetrical. A win by one side often created greater doubts about the 
entire selection process among the losers than faith in it among the 
winners. So it was with the decision to have Congress vote by joint ballot 
 
 120. Id. at 108–09. Ellsworth did not explain whether the electors would simply be asked 
whether to re-elect the President, the negative answer to which would send the issue back to 
Congress, or whether the electors could choose an alternative President. 
 121. Id. at 111–12. 
 122. Id. at 111, 115. 
 123. Id. at 119. At that point, the Convention endorsed the selection of the President by 
Congress for a single term, this time for a period of seven years. Id. at 120. 
 124. Id. at 401 (statement of Mr. Sherman). 
 125. Id. at 402 (statement of Mr. Ghorum). See also id. (statement of Mr. Wilson) (noting 
“danger of delay” if assent of both houses was required). 
 126. Id. at 403. 
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of each house. Even after the Great Compromise, the smaller states 
viewed Congress as an institution beholden to the larger states. In the 
smaller states’ view, the joint ballot minimized their influence by 
submerging it within an institutional structure in which the population-
linked House would dwarf the federal Senate.127 Their concerns 
regarding the larger states’ motives were only magnified when, 
immediately after the vote on the joint ballot, the larger states defeated a 
proposal to have the joint ballot conducted on a state-by-state basis with 
each state possessing one vote.128 Yet, the adoption of the joint ballot did 
not enamor the larger states either. The primary problem with 
congressional appointment had not been that the smaller states would 
possess too much influence over the President’s selection (something 
that the joint ballot partially redressed), but that congressional 
appointment threatened to make the President dependent on Congress 
(something left entirely unresolved by the adoption of the joint ballot).129 
In short, the adoption of the joint ballot alienated one group of states 
without endearing the selection process to the other states. 
To resolve the impasse and devise a satisfactory compromise, the 
Convention delegates decided to entrust the matter to a committee on 
“postponed matters”—also known as the “Committee of Eleven”—in 
which each state had a representative.130 Reporting back to the full 
Convention, the committee shelved the system of congressional 
appointment and instead endorsed selection by an Electoral College. 
Specifically, under the committee’s proposal, the President would be 
selected by electors appointed by the states in the manner determined by 
each state’s legislature.131 To allay smaller states’ fears, each state would 
receive the same number of electors as it had representatives and 
senators in the Congress.132 The electors would meet in their own states 
and vote for two candidates, one of which could not be an inhabitant of 
their own state.133 The candidate possessing the highest number of votes 
would become President, while the runner-up would become Vice 
President. Critically, however, the committee specified that, to become 
President, the winning candidate must receive an absolute majority of the 
 
 127. Id. at 402 (statements of Mr. Dayton and Mr. Brearly). 
 128. Id. at 403. 
 129. Id. at 403–04 (statement of Mr. Morris). 
 130. Id. at 473, 481. 
 131. Id. at 493–94. 
 132. Id. at 494. 
 133. Id. 
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Electoral College; a plurality would not suffice.134 In the event that there 
was no majority candidate or a tie between the leading candidates, it 
would fall to the Senate to choose the President from among the top five 
vote recipients in the Electoral College balloting.135 The President would 
serve a four-year term and be eligible for reappointment.136 
The committee’s proposal attempted to respond to the criticisms that 
had been leveled against the process of legislative appointment that had 
emerged in the preceding weeks. To promote the energetic discharge of 
his duties, the President was eligible for reelection, but, to guard against 
legislative encroachment on his powers, his selection was now to be 
made by an independent body of electors, not Congress.137 As to who 
would appoint the electors, the only two serious alternatives that had 
been discussed were selection by the people or selection by the state 
legislatures. Between the two, the former had drawn negligible support; 
indeed, Wilson’s original proposal to that effect at the beginning of the 
Convention had been overwhelmingly defeated. Hence, the committee 
entrusted the selection of electors to the state legislatures. To preserve 
the contours of the Great Compromise, each state received the same 
number of electors as it had representatives and senators. To avoid cabal 
and intrigue among the electors, the electors would not meet together but 
separately in their own states,138 and to ensure that the larger states did 
not simply appoint their own as President, each elector would vote for 
two candidates, one of which could not be an inhabitant of his own state. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the delegates from the smaller 
states, an absolute majority of electors was necessary to elect the 
President, the absence of which would send the election to the Senate, 
where the smaller states had political power equal to that of the larger 
states. 
Balancing the respective weights of the larger and smaller states was 
one of the central problems and tasks confronting the delegates at the 
Convention, and the process for selecting the President proposed by the 
Committee of Eleven reflected this fundamental divide. Ironically, the 
Electoral College was viewed as empowering the larger states at the 
expense of the smaller ones precisely because the more populous states 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 493, 494. 
 137. Id. at 500–01 (statements of Mr. Morris and Mr. Butler). 
 138. Id. at 500 (statement of Mr. Morris). 
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would have more electors. To modern eyes, the inclusion of the two 
“senatorial” electors gives the smaller states undue political weight. That 
is because contemporary commentators use a “one person, one vote” 
standard as the appropriate baseline against which to evaluate political 
power. The framers, however, were not such pure majoritarians.139 
Rather, for the framers, the operative baseline against which to evaluate 
the Electoral College was the Confederation Congress, in which each 
state received an equal vote. Measured by that baseline, the proposed 
Electoral College expanded the political influence of the larger states at 
the expense of the smaller states. As James Madison observed, the 
inclusion of the Senate would lessen the larger states’ influence 
compared to what they would have under a fully population-based 
system, but, even so, the larger states would have much more power than 
smaller states.140 
The smaller states, in return, extracted two important concessions. 
The first was the inclusion of the two “senatorial” electors in the 
apportionment of electors among the states. Ironically, at the time, that 
feature was viewed as largely unimportant. That apportionment of 
electors had been implicitly endorsed by the delegates in the wake of the 
Great Compromise when they repeatedly approved congressional 
appointment of the President, and it had been expressly ratified when the 
Convention endorsed the notion that the President would be chosen by a 
joint ballot of both houses of Congress, which would have produced a 
system that allocated political power to each state in the same proportion 
as the proposed Electoral College. In fact, at the time of the debate 
regarding the joint ballot, the smaller states viewed the inclusion of the 
Senate as part of a joint ballot as insufficiently protective of their 
influence in the President’s election. For that reason, no delegate—from 
either larger or smaller states—pointed to the inclusion of the two 
“senatorial” electors as either sufficient to protect the smaller states’ 
influence or politically unfair to the citizens of the larger states.141 
The second and more important change for the benefit of the smaller 
states was the requirement that the President receive a majority of the 
 
 139. This is revealed most conspicuously by their treatment of African American slaves, but it 
is also shown by the host of suffrage restrictions imposed by the states that limited this franchise, 
which restrictions were carried over and applied to the elections for the House of Representatives. 
Even the most “democratic” plan offered at the Convention—the Virginia Plan—apportioned 
Congress on the basis of the “free” population of each state. 
 140. Id. at 403 (statement of Mr. Madison). 
 141. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 17. 
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Electoral College. If no candidate received a majority, the election would 
go to the Senate. The framers doubted that there would be candidates 
who could receive an outright majority of electoral votes. Candidates of 
such national renown were likely to be few, and, because the Electoral 
College never actually met and balloted only once, there would be no 
second or ensuing rounds of deliberations in which a candidate could 
muster a majority. Hence, in the expectation of many framers, the 
election would regularly fall to the Senate. As George Mason imagined 
it, “nineteen times in twenty” the election would fall to the Senate.142 Of 
course, entrusting the ultimate election to the Senate favored smaller 
states, as each state possessed the same, equal influence in the Senate. To 
mollify the larger states, the committee’s proposal therefore limited the 
Senate to selecting among the top five vote recipients in the Electoral 
College. Thus, as Madison and other framers viewed it, the larger states 
would nominate the candidates (through their influence in the Electoral 
College), while the smaller states would ultimately select among those 
candidates (through their influence in the Senate).143 
Only one aspect of the Committee of Eleven’s proposal drew 
sustained criticism: the use of the Senate as the fallback forum for 
selection. Charles Pinckney and George Mason both pointed out that, by 
vesting the power of selection in the Senate, the committee’s plan 
courted the very danger it meant to avoid by rendering the President 
dependent upon legislative approval, albeit the approval of only one 
house rather than both.144 Their concerns, however, were dismissed on 
the ground that the Senate could only select from among the top 
candidates nominated by the Electoral College.145 The delegates were 
 
 142. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 500 (statement of Col. Mason). See also id. at 500 
(statement of Mr. Madison), 501 (statement of Mr. Pinckney), 511 (statement of Mr. Rutledge), 524–
25 (statement of Mr. Hamilton). Several delegates envisioned that national development would make 
the emergence of national candidates more likely over time, thereby moving the selection from the 
Senate to the Electoral College. Id. at 501 (statements of Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Wilson). 
Nevertheless, to increase the likelihood that the Electoral College would actually elect the President, 
Madison proposed to eliminate the majority requirement and instead insert a minimum floor of one-
third of the electors as the necessary plurality, but Madison’s motion was defeated handily. Id. at 
514. Elbridge Gerry declared that a plurality requirement would effectively give the larger states the 
exclusive power to elect the President. Id. (statement of Mr. Gerry). 
 143. Id. at 500 (statements of Mr. Madison and Mr. Morris), 512–13 (statement of Mr. 
Sherman); see also RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 266 (“[T]he prevailing expectation was that the 
electoral college would only limit, not eliminate, a legislative role in selecting the president.”). 
 144. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 511 (statement of Mr. Pinckney), 512 (statement 
of Col. Mason). 
 145. Interestingly, Madison viewed the use of the Senate as somewhat helpful to the larger 
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more apprehensive about the Senate’s presumed aristocratic nature. 
James Wilson worried that, unlike representatives, senators would be 
much more prone to “influence [and] faction” owing to their longer 
terms and appointment by the state legislatures.146 Hugh Williamson 
fretted that senatorial selection laid the foundation for “corruption [and] 
aristocracy.”147 Moreover, the framers’ earlier decisions to vest the 
Senate with the power to approve presidential appointments and treaties 
gave added force to the concern that, augmented with the power to select 
the President, the Senate would be too powerful an entity.148 As James 
Wilson warned, “the President will not be the man of the people as he 
ought to be, but the Minion of the Senate.”149 The solution, ingeniously 
proposed by Roger Sherman,150 was to vest the fallback selection in the 
House, but with the proviso that the balloting be conducted on a state-by-
state basis with each state receiving one vote. In that way, the selection 
would mimic the Senate with its equality of state political power, but it 
would be made by the House, whose members enjoyed a more 
democratic pedigree. Sherman’s proposal passed overwhelmingly.151 A 
little over a week later, the delegates approved the full Constitution.152 
Modern observers are amazed by the extent to which the framers 
misperceived the forces that would shape presidential elections in the 
new republic. In the framers’ views, the presidential electors would be 
quasi-platonic guardians possessing great wisdom, exhibiting superior 
character, and exercising independent judgment in selecting among the 
 
states, who would then be encouraged to identify candidates who could prevail in the Electoral 
College so as to avoid having the smaller states make the ultimate selection in the Senate. Id. at 513 
(statement of Mr. Madison). Mason’s motion to remove the proviso that the President be elected by a 
majority of the Electoral College was defeated 9–2. Id. at 512–13. At the same time, efforts to 
change the number of candidates among which the Senate could choose also failed. Mason’s motion 
to restrict the Senate to the top three vote recipients and Spaight’s contrary motion to expand the 
number to thirteen (made with the transparent motive to allow each state to nominate a favorite son 
for the final balloting in the Senate) were both overwhelmingly defeated. Id. at 514–15. See also 
PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 27. 
 146. 2 Farrand, RECORDS, supra note 15, at 502 (statement of Mr. Wilson). 
 147. Id. at 512 (statement of Mr. Williamson). 
 148. Id. at 513 (statement of Mr. Randolph) (arguing that granting power of presidential 
appointment to the Senate would “convert that body into a real [and] dangerous [a]ristocracy”); id. 
(statement of Mr. Dickinson). Gouverneur Morris worried that, in light of the Senate’s role of 
confirming presidential appointments, senatorial selection would make the President too obedient to 
the Senate’s will in appointing executive officials. Id. at 522 (statement of Mr. Morris). 
 149. Id. at 523 (statement of Mr. Wilson). 
 150. Id. at 527. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 633. 
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leading candidates of their day; they would not be servile party Brahmins 
committed to the election of their own party’s candidate.153 In the 
framers’ view, the election of the President regularly would fall to the 
House, in which each state would possess an equal vote in the selection 
of the President; the Electoral College with its bias toward the larger 
states would not end up being the actual electoral forum. Perhaps most 
importantly, in the framers’ view, the primary political division that the 
selection process had to mediate was between larger and smaller states 
and, to a lesser extent, between slave and free states; the framers could 
not (and did not) anticipate that these divisions would be eclipsed by 
other distinctions among the states (e.g., coastal v. interior; 
predominantly urban v. predominantly rural; agricultural v. industrial v. 
commercial) that could not be neatly salved by the inclusion of two 
“senatorial” electors for each state or the implicit promise of the election 
being conducted in the House of Representatives.154 In fact, even before 
those more profound changes in the American socio-political landscape 
took place, the rise of national political parties united around a single 
presidential candidate subverted and ultimately dashed the framers’ 
expectations, producing an electoral system substantively unlike (even if 
formally obeisant to) that contemplated in Philadelphia in 1787. In a very 
real sense, the presidential election for which the framers so earnestly 
planned never took place. 
Nevertheless, several elements of the framers’ deliberations bear 
particular significance for the debate over the NPVC’s constitutionality. 
First, and less importantly, the framers expressly and overwhelmingly 
rejected vesting the selection of the President directly in the people. 
Despite their republican instincts, the delegates believed that the people 
would be unable to identify worthy candidates, most of whom (in the 
framers’ expectations) would be unknown to the people at large. In a 
predominantly rural nation lacking a developed system of public 
education and a nationwide system of transportation or communication, 
theirs was not a trifling concern. Of course, the rise of national political 
parties, along with the establishment of public education and the 
development of mass communication among the states, has rendered this 
 
 153. But see McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892) (noting that the framers’ 
expectation regarding electors has been “frustrated”). 
 154. See RAKOVE, supra note 71, at 268 (“[P]recisely because the electoral college extended 
‘the Great Compromise’ over representation, with its dubious expectation that the division between 
small and large states would persist beyond 1787, its formal logic proved irrelevant to the actual 
politics of presidential election.”). 
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particular concern of less moment. Even by the early- to mid- nineteenth 
century, the two major political parties had succeeded in making the 
presidential campaign a national race in which the parties’ candidates 
were well known across the nation. Today, with our system of state-
funded public education for all and national media outlets, the suggestion 
that the people are too uninformed to vote intelligibly sounds deeply 
elitist and anti-republican. 
Second, and of more contemporary relevance, the selection of the 
President was not to be a raw majoritarian process in which each person 
had an equal ability to influence the election of the President. Indeed, 
recall that in mid-July, when Gouverneur Morris proposed a nationwide, 
direct popular election, Charles Pinckney and Hugh Williamson had 
opposed it precisely on the ground that, in their view, it would favor 
more populous states.155 As a result, the Convention overwhelmingly 
rejected Morris’s proposal. Instead, by the end of the summer, the 
framers had settled on a presidential election process that echoed and 
preserved the essential contours of the Great Compromise. The Electoral 
College would reflect the hybrid nature of the bicameral Congress, with 
states receiving the number of electors equal to their joint House and 
Senate representation. 
Ironically, the framers viewed the new Constitution’s allocation of 
electoral weight as favoring the larger states. The smaller states would 
receive proportionately more influence than they would under a purely 
population-based system, but the larger states would still command 
greater power as a practical matter in the Electoral College. The fact that 
states received electors based in part on the number of representatives 
they had in the population-based House overshadowed the inclusion of 
the two “senatorial” electors. Moreover, given the expectation that the 
national population would grow and, with it, the size of the House of 
Representatives, the influence of the “senatorial” electors in the Electoral 
College would likely diminish over time. History, of course, has 
confirmed the framers’ expectation in this regard: today, the 
“malapportionment” of the Electoral College is much less than it was in 
the first presidential election in 1788. 
Third, and relatedly, the framers embraced a presidential election 
system in which the selection of presidential electors would be made on a 
state-by-state basis with each state’s electors accountable to the people of 
that state. This last aspect of the process has been overlooked, but it 
 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 103–05. 
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bears special relevance for the debate over the constitutionality of the 
NPVC. The framers did not specify how the state legislatures would 
select their electors—whether, for example, the electors would be 
appointed by the legislature or elected by the people of the state—but the 
expectation was that those electors would reflect directly or indirectly the 
choice of each state’s own electorate. It was for that reason that the 
inclusion of “senatorial” electors in the Electoral College mollified the 
concerns of the smaller states that the presidential election process would 
be too majoritarian. Had the framers thought it permissible for a group of 
states to agree to appoint their electors in accordance with some national 
popular election, most of the framers would have surely opposed it. 
Again, the overwhelming defeat of Gouverneur Morris’s proposal for a 
direct, national popular election is instructive. If the framers feared a 
direct, popular election as too majoritarian, they surely would have 
opposed even more vehemently the notion that a subgroup of populous 
states could adopt such a system. 
For better or worse, the framers had created a presidential election 
system that, like the “Great Compromise” upon which it was based, 
combined elements of majoritarianism and federalism. The choice of 
President would be made not by an undifferentiated mass of people 
nationwide, but by electors accountable to the people of their individual 
states. To be sure, the framers did not make these expectations express. 
The notion that any state would appoint its electors in accordance with 
the wishes, even in part, of voters in other states was beyond the 
imagination of any at the time. Nevertheless, if any doubt about this 
expectation exists, it is negated by actual experience. As Part III will 
show, the actual practice of the states in the wake of the Constitutional 
Convention—a practice that has continued to this day—demonstrates the 
universal understanding among the states, both then and now, that 
presidential electors from each state are to be selected in accordance with 
the will of the voters in each state, not the entire national populace. 
III. THE HISTORY OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 
As discussed above, the framers assigned the power to determine the 
selection of the presidential electors to the state legislatures.156 The 
framers, though, did not discuss how the state legislatures would actually 
 
 156. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (providing that electors will be selected by each state “in such 
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct”). 
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select their electors.157 The states were left to their own devices in 
determining what process to use. Nevertheless, the states’ actual use of 
this power in the decades following the Constitutional Convention belies 
the notion that states have the power to appoint their electors in 
accordance with a national popular vote. Not once in our over-two-
hundred-year history has even one state appointed its electors on this 
basis. Rather, in every presidential election, every state has appointed its 
electors in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state. That 
uniform, long-standing practice informs the appropriate understanding of 
Article II, and, in so doing, condemns the NPVC. 
A. The Early History 
The brief time between the ratification of the Constitution in the 
summer of 1788 and the first presidential election that winter gave the 
states little opportunity to contemplate the proper method for selecting 
presidential electors. Even if they had given it much thought, the virtual 
certainty that George Washington would become the first President 
divested the choice of process of much importance as a practical matter. 
Coupled with the absence of any constitutional guidance, Washington’s 
immense popularity made the determination of the process for selecting 
electors in each state largely meaningless. The result of the presidential 
election was a foregone conclusion. Hence, it is little surprise that the ten 
states that participated in the first election took widely divergent 
approaches to the appointment of their electors.158 
Of the ten states, four left the selection of their slate of electors 
entirely to the legislature.159 Five of the ten states conducted popular 
elections for the presidential electors, but the electoral processes differed 
in significant respects. Three of the five states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
and New Hampshire) provided that their electors would be elected by the 
people in a statewide, at-large process, also known as a “general ticket” 
system, that allowed each voter to vote for as many electors as that state 
was entitled to appoint.160 Virginia provided that its electors would be 
 
 157. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 24. 
 158. New York’s legislature deadlocked regarding how to select its electors, resulting in its 
inability to participate in the first election. Meanwhile, North Carolina and Rhode Island had yet to 
ratify the Constitution. 
 159. Act of Nov. 4, 1788, § 4, 1788 S.C. Acts 4. New Jersey vested the selection of its electors 
in the upper house of the legislature—the legislative council—and included the governor in the 
council’s voting. Act of Nov. 21, 1788, ch. 241, § 8, 1788 N.J. Laws 481. 
 160. Act of Dec. 22, 1788, ch. 10, § 6, 1788 Md. Laws 317, 319; Act of Oct. 4, 1788, ch. 166, 
WILLIAMS (DO NOT DELETE) 2/8/2013  2:57 PM 
1523 Why the NPVC Is Unconstitutional 
 1561 
elected by the people in districts, with each voter entitled to elect one 
elector from his district.161 Meanwhile, Delaware established a unique 
system that combined features of an at-large and district contest: each 
citizen was allowed to vote for only one elector, who had to reside in his 
county, but the top three vote recipients statewide (not the top recipient 
from each county) became the state’s electors.162 Finally, Massachusetts 
combined legislative and popular appointment in a hybrid process: the 
people in each congressional district voted for an elector for that district, 
but their vote was advisory. The legislature selected the elector for each 
congressional district from the top two vote recipients in that district. In 
addition, the Massachusetts legislature appointed the two “senatorial” 
electors without any popular consultation.163 
In the election of 1792, the experience of the first election and the 
passage of time gave the states the opportunity to reassess their selection 
systems, though few did so. Of the original ten states that participated in 
the first presidential election, eight maintained their existing systems. 
Massachusetts dispensed with its complicated hybrid system that 
combined popular consultation with legislative appointment and instead 
adopted an equally complex system of popular elections that was a cross 
between an at-large and district system.164 Meanwhile, moving in the 
opposite direction, Delaware substituted legislative appointment for its 
complex, popular election system that combined features from the at-
large and districting modes.165 Delaware’s shift to legislative 
 
§ 3, 1788 Pa. Laws 140, 142–43; Act of Nov. 12, 1788, 1788 N.H. Laws 473, 473–74. Maryland 
required a degree of geographic diversity. Although each citizen was entitled to vote for up to eight 
electors, the Maryland statute provided that five of the eight electors must reside in the “western 
shore” and three electors reside in the “eastern shore.” Act of Dec. 22, 1788, ch. 10, § 6, 1788 Md. 
Laws 317, 319. New Hampshire, meanwhile, required that each elector receive a majority of the 
votes cast, and if that did not work, the legislature would appoint the electors from the leading vote 
recipients. Act of Nov. 12, 1788, 1788 N.H. Laws 473, 474–75. The failure of any elector to receive 
the required majority left the New Hampshire Legislature with no choice but to select the electors 
itself. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 30 (1892). 
 161. Act of Nov. 17, 1788, ch. 1, §§ 1–2, 1788 Va. Acts 3, 3. 
 162. Act of Oct. 28, 1788, §§ 1–3, 1788 Del. Laws 4–6. 
 163. Act of Nov. 19, 1788, Res. 49, 1788 Mass. Acts 52. 
 164. Act of June 30, 1792, Res. 80, 1792 Mass. Acts 25. Instead of allocating one elector to 
each congressional district, the legislature created four large, special districts, allotting five electors 
each to two of the districts and three electors each to the other two districts. Id. Citizens could vote 
for as many electors to which their district was entitled. As New Hampshire originally had provided, 
if a sufficient number of candidates did not receive a majority of votes, the legislature would appoint 
the remaining number of electors. Id. 
 165. Del. H.R. Journal, Nov. 1792 Sess., at 9–10. New Hampshire also made a more modest 
alteration. Under its original law, the legislature appointed electors to fill slots for which there was 
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appointment was telling—New York, along with the newly admitted 
states of Rhode Island, North Carolina, Vermont, and Kentucky, all 
opted for legislative appointment.166 As a result, of the fifteen states 
participating in the election, ten states possessing sixty-six electoral 
votes—sixty-six percent of the total number of states and fifty percent of 
the Electoral College—used legislative appointment. 
The 1796 election witnessed a modest shift away from legislative 
appointment. Georgia and North Carolina replaced legislative 
appointment with popular elections, the former employing an at-large 
system, the latter using a district system.167 Somewhat bucking the trend, 
Massachusetts returned to its original system from 1789 in which the 
people of each congressional district voted for an elector therefrom and 
the legislature appointed the two “senatorial” electors.168 Meanwhile, 
Tennessee, which had been recently admitted as a state, eschewed both 
legislative appointment and popular election, opting instead for a truly 
bizarre approach. The legislature divided the state into three districts, 
but, professing to want to cause “as little trouble to the citizens as 
possible,” it then appointed a group of private individuals in each district 
to select the elector for that district.169 The net result of these 
developments was that, of the sixteen states participating in the election, 
eight states used legislative appointment, three states used a popular, at-
large election system, three used a popular, district election system, and 
 
no candidate receiving a majority of the vote. See supra text accompanying note 160. New 
Hampshire eliminated legislative appointment as the fall-back mechanism and provided instead that 
there would be a second popular election at which state citizens would choose from among the top 
candidates from the first round of balloting. Act of June 20, 1792, 1792 N.H. Laws 398. 
 166. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 32 (1892) (listing Kentucky among states that used 
legislative appointment in 1792 election). Unlike the other states that used legislative appointment, 
North Carolina’s legislature subdelegated its appointment power to smaller groups of legislators, 
creating four districts of three electors each and empowering the legislators in those districts to 
appoint their district’s electors. Act of 1792, ch. 15, N.C. Sess. Laws 8. North Carolina’s system 
resembled Massachusetts’s, except that the selection of electors was made by the legislators 
representing the specially constituted districts rather than by the people thereof. 
 167. Act of 1792, ch. 16, N.C. Sess. Laws 9; PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 248–49 
(reporting Georgia as using popular, at-large election in 1786). Relatedly, Maryland switched from 
an at-large to a district-based system. Act of Dec. 24, 1795, ch. 73, 647 Md. Laws 66. 
 168. Act of June 13, 1796, Res. 20, 1796 Mass. Acts 12–13. Unlike the original statute, the 
1796 resolution made the people’s vote binding so long as the winning candidate received a majority 
of the vote. New Hampshire likewise returned to its original system in which, though the people 
voted in an at-large process for the state’s electors, the legislature appointed electors to fill positions 
if there were not a sufficient number of candidates receiving a majority of votes statewide. Act of 
June 16, 1796, 1796 N.H. Laws 544, 545–46. 
 169. Act of Aug. 8, 1796, ch. 4, 1796 Tenn. Pub. Acts. 109, 109–10.  
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one state used a hybrid model, with Tennessee’s legislative-appointment-
of-the-selectors-of-the-electors system posing an anomalous departure 
from the prevalent models of selection. 
The election of 1796 was more noteworthy for the role that it played 
in the development of perhaps the most important extra-constitutional 
force in presidential elections—the establishment of national political 
parties. The Federalist John Adams narrowly won election as President 
over Republican Thomas Jefferson who, per the then-existing provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution, became Vice President. Adams and Jefferson’s 
political differences, which had become apparent during the Washington 
administration, grew over the course of the Adams administration, which 
polarized American politics. Opponents of the Adams administration, 
along with former anti-Federalists who had opposed the Constitution, 
were drawn to Jefferson and James Madison, becoming the core of the 
new Republican (later named Democratic) party. Over the course of the 
next four years, both Federalists and Republicans prepared themselves 
for a hotly contested, partisan presidential election that they knew to be 
coming in 1800. 
The emergence of a two-party system had profound ramifications for 
the process by which Presidents were elected. Electors would not be 
engaging in some deliberative, nonpartisan process of selecting the 
person that they thought would be the best President. That romantic view 
of electors had always been fanciful, but with the development of 
partisan politics, the notion of the Platonic elector was absurd. Electors 
would come from one of the two parties and would almost certainly vote 
for the candidate from their party regardless of his merits. 
More importantly, the development of a two-party structure 
influenced the selection of the process used to select the electors. 
Precisely because the electors would be committed partisans, it became 
necessary for each party to ensure that its committed partisans were 
selected. And that, in turn, made the determination of the selection 
process deeply partisan. Whether a particular state opted for legislative 
appointment or popular election (and, if so, what form) turned less on 
abstract political theory and more on an acute, state-specific assessment 
as to whether appointment or election would favor one party or the 
other.170 
 
 170. Josephson & Ross, supra note 4, at 154 (“In anticipation of the election of 1800, there 
was scrambling in state after state to revise the mode for choosing electors as one party or both tried 
to gain an edge.”). 
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B. The Election of 1800 
Even with the development of the parties still in their infancy, the 
election of 1800 witnessed the first significant effects of political 
partisanship on the presidential selection process. Reversing the trend 
from the previous election in 1796, four states that had previously used 
popular election (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and 
Georgia) opted for legislative appointment.171 Illustrating the emerging 
influence of partisanship, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, whose 
legislatures were controlled by Federalists, largely did so to ensure that 
the entire slate of electors in each state would be pledged to Federalist 
Adams.172 Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, the Federalist-controlled Senate 
prevented the passage of a new election law to authorize a popular 
election for the state’s electors, which the Federalists feared would lead 
to the politically ascendant Republicans securing the entire slate of 
electors. The Federalists then demanded a share of the legislatively 
appointed electors.173 Only one state, Rhode Island, moved in the 
opposite direction, substituting popular election at-large for legislative 
appointment. 
Nor were the Federalists alone in using their control of state 
legislatures to select the process most advantageous for their party’s 
candidate. Virginia, whose legislature the Republicans controlled, shifted 
from its district-based system to an at-large system so as to ensure that 
Thomas Jefferson, its native son, would win all of the state’s electoral 
votes. Pointing to the relative disadvantage to which the district system 
exposed the state, Jefferson defended Virginia’s action as driven by the 
fact that “while ten States choose either by their legislatures or by a 
general ticket, it is folly and worse than folly for the other six not to do 
it.”174 Virginia’s move was particularly noteworthy, as it presaged 
 
 171. Act of June 14, 1800, 1800 N.H. Laws 563; Act of June 6, 1800, res. 4, 1800 Mass. Acts 
13; H.R. Journal, 11, 1st Sess., at 97 (Pa. 1800) (reporting that the two houses of the legislature 
would convene jointly that day to appoint electors); H.R. Journal, 1800 Sess., at 26 (Ga. 1801); S. 
Journal, 1800 Sess., at 25. (Ga. 1800). 
 172. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 38. 
 173. Id. The Pennsylvania legislature deadlocked over the slate of legislatively appointed 
electors. This was necessitated by its failure to provide for a popular election because the Federalist 
Senate refused to agree to a joint ballot, which the Federalists knew would allow the more numerous 
and Republican-dominated House to select the full slate of electors. Only after a compromise was 
reached that divided the state’s electors between the two houses was the legislature able to appoint a 
slate of electors. Id. 
 174. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe (Jan. 12, 1800). 
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similar shifts to an at-large or winner-take-all system in other states in 
the years ahead. 
The net result of these partisan-influenced moves was that, of the 
sixteen states participating in the 1800 election, only five states used a 
popular election system, two employing an at-large system (Rhode Island 
and Virginia) and three employing a district system (Maryland, 
Kentucky, and North Carolina).175 In contrast, ten states possessing 
eighty-four electoral votes—which represented almost two-thirds of the 
total number of states and more than sixty percent of the Electoral 
College—used legislative appointment. The election of 1800 marked the 
high-water point of legislative appointment—never again would so many 
states comprising such a high percentage of the Electoral College use 
legislative appointment.176 
In addition to demonstrating the influence of partisanship in the 
selection of the elector appointment process, the election of 1800 was 
noteworthy for several other important reasons. First, it was the first time 
the election was thrown to the House of Representatives. The two 
Republican candidates, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr, both received 
seventy-three electoral votes—the incumbent President Adams took third 
place with sixty-five votes. Because of the tie, the election was thrown to 
the lame-duck, Federalist-dominated House of Representatives.177 
Through thirty-five separate ballots lasting almost a week, the Federalists 
worked to prevent Jefferson’s election.178 Finally, on the thirty-sixth 
ballot, the Federalist representative in the Vermont delegation cast a 
blank ballot, thereby allowing his Republican colleague to cast the state’s 
vote for Jefferson, which in turn gave Thomas Jefferson the necessary 
majority to become the third President of the United States.179 While the 
 
 175. Tennessee—again—delegated the appointment power to a small group of individuals in 
each district as it had in 1796. 
 176. The election of 1800 was not the high water mark in terms of the absolute number of 
legislatively appointed electors. In the election of 1816, there were ninety-six legislatively appointed 
electors sent from nine states, but because the Electoral College had since been expanded to 217 
electors, the legislatively appointed electors constituted a minority of the College. 
 177. The Federalists held a 60–46 advantage in the House, but because the House would vote 
by state, not per capita, on the presidency, Federalists could not translate their numerical dominance 
into a victory for Adams. Federalists controlled eight of the sixteen delegations, one short of the 
necessary majority, while the Republicans controlled seven delegations. Vermont’s delegation was 
split equally between the two parties. 
 178. The Federalists generally voted for Burr, thereby producing a state vote for Burr in 
delegations in which they had a majority, or, equally as good, splitting the state, thereby depriving 
Jefferson from receiving the necessary majority of states. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 40. 
 179. Id. at 40–41. 
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House had finally succeeded in discharging its constitutional 
responsibility, the House deliberations did not even closely resemble the 
process that the framers had expected. For the framers, the assignment of 
the election to the House, voting on a state-by-state basis with each state 
possessing one vote, served to protect the smaller states from having a 
candidate favored by the larger states foisted upon them. As the debate in 
the House in 1800 revealed, however, the principal divide was between 
Republican-dominated House congressional delegations, who backed 
Jefferson, and Federalist-dominated ones, who, out of spite, backed Burr. 
Partisan divisions, not geopolitical ones, shaped the House proceedings. 
Second, and relatedly, the election of 1800 prompted the passage of 
the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. Under the Constitution as 
originally enacted, each elector simultaneously cast two votes.180 The 
candidate with the most votes receiving a majority of the number of 
electoral votes became President, while the runner-up became Vice 
President. This system had already shown one undesirable aspect in 
1796, when the losing candidate (Jefferson) became the Vice President in 
the administration that he had opposed. The election of 1800, though, 
illustrated a different, darker problem with this system of balloting. 
Under the Electoral College’s simultaneous voting system, there was no 
way for an elector to indicate his preference for President between the 
two candidates from his party for whom he was casting his vote. As a 
consequence, if each elector cast his two votes for the two candidates 
from his party (as partisan electors typically would), a tie among the 
winning party’s two candidates would inevitably occur, as in fact 
happened in 1800. Worse still, the tie would throw the election into the 
House, where the losing party might have control and be able to elect its 
candidate (who had lost the election) or, only slightly less bad, choose 
the President from among the winning party’s two candidates (which is 
effectively what had happened in the 1800 election). With the 
development of political parties and partisan electors, the Electoral 
College’s simultaneous balloting system was out of step with American 
politics. 
The ratification of the Twelfth Amendment in 1804 addressed these 
problems. Each elector would continue to cast two votes, but now the 
votes would be cast separately, one specifically for President and one 
specifically for Vice President. By allowing for a ticket system, the 
Twelfth Amendment thereby eliminated the prospect of a tie between the 
 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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two candidates of the winning party. Moreover, it also ensured that the 
Vice President would come from the same party as the President—the 
fractured, antagonistic administration produced by the 1796 election 
would not be repeated. Less importantly, the Twelfth Amendment also 
reduced the number of candidates that the House would select among in 
case of an Electoral College tie from five to three. 
C. The Rise of Winner-Take-All Popular Elections 
The development of a two-party system, coupled with the 
Republican party’s dominance of American politics in the decades 
immediately following the election of 1800, transformed the process by 
which states selected their electors. While newly admitted states often 
used legislative appointment in their first presidential election, “older” 
states that had used legislative appointment gradually began to replace it 
with popular elections for the electors.181 In the elections of 1812, 1816, 
and 1820, nine different states used legislative appointment, but the 
number began to fall dramatically thereafter. The rise of Jacksonian 
populism, which venerated popular elections and correspondingly 
distrusted appointed officers, put pressure on states to dispense with 
legislative appointment. In 1824, only six of the twenty-four states used 
legislative appointment, and, in 1828, only two did so.182 By 1836, all 
but South Carolina had moved to some form of popular voting for 
electors. South Carolina ultimately dispensed with legislative 
appointment after the Civil War. The last time a legislature appointed its 
electors was in 1876, when Colorado, which had just been admitted as a 
state, found itself with too little time to set up a popular election for its 
presidential electors. 
More importantly, the continuing rise of party politics after 1800 
pushed the states to dispense with district-based elections and instead 
adopt the at-large, or “winner-take-all” system prevalent today. In 1800, 
more states used district-based rather than at-large voting—a 
phenomenon that would never be repeated again. In 1804, of the eleven 
states that used popular elections, only four (Maryland, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, and Tennessee) used a pure district system, while six used at-
 
 181. PEIRCE & LONGLEY, supra note 43, at 248–49. After 1800, only three states that had 
moved to popular elections returned to legislative appointment, and, even then, they did so only for 
specific elections: Massachusetts (in 1808 and 1816), New Jersey (in 1812), and North Carolina (in 
1812). Id. 
 182. Id. 
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large voting.183 As states dispensed with legislative appointment, they 
almost invariably chose at-large elections over district-based 
elections.184 By 1824, there were still four states using district elections, 
but there were twelve states using at-large elections. Four years later, in 
1828, there were only two states using district elections, while there were 
eighteen states using at-large elections. By 1832, only Maryland adhered 
to its district-based system.185 That meant that, of the twenty-four states 
in the union at that time, twenty-two used an at-large popular election 
system for choosing the state’s presidential electors. 
The triumph of at-large voting did not eliminate district-based 
elections entirely. For the same reasons that at-large elections were 
favored by the dominant political party in a state, district elections were 
favored by the minority party as a way to fragment the state’s electoral 
vote and award some electoral votes to their own voters. Hence, after the 
1890 election, when Democrats took control of the state legislature in the 
then-predominantly Republican state, they immediately replaced 
Michigan’s at-large process with a district-process.186 As a result, in the 
1892 presidential election, Michigan split its electoral votes, with nine 
going to the Republican incumbent, Benjamin Harrison, and five going 
to the Democratic candidate, Grover Cleveland. Two years later, when 
the Republicans retook the Michigan legislature, they immediately 
repealed the districting law and returned the state to an at-large 
system.187 Besides illustrating the linkage between partisan politics and 
the method of election, the Michigan episode also revealed another 
distinctly American feature of presidential elections: the judicial 
challenge to election processes. Upset by the Democrats’ actions, 
Michigan Republicans challenged the move to district elections as 
unconstitutional, resulting in the first U.S. Supreme Court decision 
regarding presidential elections, McPherson v. Blacker,188 in which the 
Court upheld Michigan’s decision to use district elections as within the 
 
 183. Id. at 248. Massachusetts used a hybrid system that combined the district and at-large 
process. 
 184. After 1800, only Massachusetts, which vacillated among the various processes until 1824 
when it settled on at-large elections, Tennessee (in 1804), and Illinois (in 1820) adopted district-
based election systems. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Act of May 1, 1891, No. 50, 1891 Mich. Pub. Acts 50; see also GEORGE H. KNOLES, THE 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND ELECTION OF 1892, at 226–27 (1942). 
 187. Act of Feb. 3, 1893, No. 3, 1893, Mich. Pub. Acts 4. 
 188. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
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power delegated by Article II to the states. McPherson would come to 
play a central role in modern disputes involving the Electoral College. 
Today, the Electoral College is comprised of 538 electors,189 and 
every state uses popular elections to select that state’s presidential 
electors. Moreover, every state but Maine and Nebraska use “winner-
take-all” voting, in which all the state’s electors go to the candidate who 
received the most votes in the statewide polling. Maine and Nebraska, 
meanwhile, use a hybrid system first adopted by Massachusetts in 1804 
that combines the district and at-large voting system: one elector is 
selected by the people in each congressional district, with the state’s two 
“senatorial” electors going to the winner of the statewide vote.190 
D. Lessons for Today 
There is, of course, a deep irony with respect to the modern election 
system that has emerged over time. As a result of the states’ decision to 
use popular elections, the modern process more closely resembles the 
system that James Wilson first advocated in the early days of the 
Constitutional Convention than the process the Convention actually 
adopted.191 Wilson’s proposal for a college of electors elected by the 
people in districts was defeated overwhelmingly; yet, that is close to the 
system that has emerged. To be sure, the rise of party politics has shaped 
that system in ways that Wilson could not have foreseen. In particular, 
the electors exercise no independent judgment—they are party 
functionaries who loyally transmit the electorate’s choice. Indeed, as a 
result of the development of the “short” ballot in which only the 
presidential candidates are listed, voters typically do not even know the 
identities of the electors that they are appointing. Nevertheless, Wilson’s 
repeated calls to have the President selected by the people have 
ultimately carried the day. 
At the same time, however, this history illuminates and informs the 
scope of state power under Article II. Throughout the nation’s history, 
 
 189. As a result of a federal statute enacted in 1911, the House of Representatives is capped at 
435 members, and the Senate currently has 100 members representing the fifty states. Act of Aug. 8, 
1911, ch. 5, §§ 1, 2, 37 Stat. 13, 14. By virtue of the Twenty-third Amendment adopted in 1961, the 
District of Columbia receives the same number of electors to which it would be entitled if it were a 
state but in no event more than that possessed by the smallest state, which is currently three. U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXIII, cl. 1. 
 190. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 21, § 802 (1964); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1038 (2008). Maine adopted 
its system in 1969, which Nebraska copied in 1992. 
 191. See supra Part II.B. 
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states have used one of four processes for selecting their presidential 
electors: (1) legislative appointment, (2) popular election in which all 
electors are selected on the basis of the statewide vote (an at-large or 
winner-take-all system), (3) popular election by district, or (4) a 
combination of the latter two electoral systems—a hybrid process in 
which some electors are elected on the basis of the statewide vote and 
some on the basis of a district vote. Critically, under all four systems, 
each state’s electors are selected in accordance with the wishes of the 
people of the state, not the nation generally. Not once between 1880 and 
today, a period in which every state in the union has conducted a 
statewide popular election for its electors, has any state selected its 
electors based on the votes of individuals in other states. Rather, as the 
framers expected, states have selected their electors based on the will of 
state voters, not the nation at large. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE COMPACT 
So what does this history portend for the NPVC? Proponents of the 
NPVC seize upon Article II, Section 1’s delegation of power to each 
state to appoint its presidential electors “in such manner as the legislature 
thereof may direct.” In their view, this grant of authority is without 
limitation, authorizing state legislatures to choose any method of 
selection that they desire. For support, they point to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, in which the Court stated that 
the states possess “plenary power” regarding the manner of selecting 
their electors.192 As this subpart demonstrates, the states’ power to 
regulate the manner of presidential elections is far more limited than the 
proponents of the NPVC contend. In fact, just as the U.S. Supreme Court 
has narrowly interpreted the states’ power to regulate congressional 
elections to prevent states from destabilizing the constitutional structure, 
so too should it deny states the power to undermine the stability of the 
presidential election process. 
A. Delegated Versus Retained Power 
That the states generally have the power to choose the manner in 
which their electors are selected begins the constitutional analysis; it 
does not end it. The states possess their electoral appointment power not 
by virtue of their preexisting sovereignty—as the federal presidency did 
 
 192. 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892). 
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not exist prior to the Constitution, the states could not have possessed 
any such power with respect to it—but by delegation from the 
Constitution.193 Hence, in assessing the scope of that power, the question 
is not whether there is any constitutionally imposed limit on state 
authority (as is the issue when the states use an authority derived from 
their pre-existing sovereignty), but rather whether the Constitution 
empowers the states to undertake the type of action under review.194 
And, in that vein, it is important to remember that the scope of a state’s 
constitutionally delegated power does not include the power to 
reconfigure or undermine the federal constitutional structure. 
The Court’s decision in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton is 
instructive in this regard.195 In the 1990s, several states imposed term 
limits on their members of Congress. Defenders of these laws pointed to 
seemingly categorical language of the Elections Clause of Article I, 
Section 4, which delegates power to the state legislatures to control the 
“Times, Places and Manner” of holding elections for Congress.196 Much 
like the NPVC’s proponents, term limit supporters argued that the 
categorical language of the Elections Clause provided state legislatures 
with plenary power to adopt any elections regulation not expressly 
forbidden by the Constitution, and, since no provision in the Constitution 
forbade term limits, they contended that state-imposed term limits were 
therefore constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed. 
In the Supreme Court’s view, the adoption of term limits was 
tantamount to imposing another qualification for federal office above and 
beyond the three qualifications identified in the Qualification Clauses of 
Article I.197 Hence, for the Court, the critical issue was whether the 
Elections Clause authorized states to impose additional qualifications for 
federal office.198 In answering that question in the negative, the Court 
 
 193. See Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000); cf. U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (concluding that state power to regulate 
congressional elections is delegated by Constitution rather than reserved power of state). 
 194. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 805. 
 195. See id. at 779. 
 196. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 197. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 814–15; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a 
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a 
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which 
he shall be chosen.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall 
not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”). 
 198. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 832–33. 
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identified three, mutually reinforcing considerations. First, and most 
importantly, the Court traced the historical understanding of Article I, 
both in the Constitutional Convention and thereafter.199 For the Court, 
the absence of any suggestion at the Constitutional Convention or 
ratification debates that the states could use their power over 
congressional elections to establish additional qualifications for office in 
general, or term limits in particular, was telling. 
Second, the Court looked to the history of congressional elections. 
At several points in American history, Congress had chosen to seat 
representatives or senators despite state laws that purported to render the 
person ineligible for office. Although these instances were limited in 
number, the Court found significant Congress’s declaration in these cases 
that the states lacked the power to set additional qualifications.200 With 
respect to term limits in particular, the Court found it probative that, both 
in the wake of the Constitutional Convention and thereafter, no state had 
sought to impose term limits for federal office.201 
Third, the Court looked to democratic theory and constitutional 
structure. For the Court, the imposition of term limits undermined the 
power of the people to choose their own representatives by denying them 
the right to reelect a long-serving representative or senator.202 Moreover, 
in the Court’s view, the constitutional structure belied the notion that 
individual states could impose term limits for members of Congress even 
from their own states. The right to select U.S. representatives and 
senators, the Court ruled, belonged not to the individual states but to the 
people of the United States.203 What the Court meant by this aphorism is 
not entirely clear, but the Court seemed to be suggesting that each 
person, no matter in what state they lived, had an interest in ensuring that 
the qualifications for Congress remained uniform throughout the nation 
and that no state be allowed to impose additional qualifications for 
service in Congress. In essence, to allow Arkansas to impose term limits 
on its U.S. representatives and senators harmed not only the citizens of 
Arkansas who might support their reelection but also the citizens of other 
states, who likewise have an interest in how Arkansas structures its 
elections for its congressional representatives. 
 
 199. Id. at 806–15. 
 200. Id. at 816–19. 
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Although Thornton involved state power under Article I’s Election 
Clause, the Court’s analysis in that case sheds light on the analogous 
question whether Article II authorizes the states to appoint their 
presidential electors based on the outcome of a national popular election 
rather than state elections. At the outset, it is important to note the 
similarity in the constitutional provisions at issue. Article I’s Elections 
Clause provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each 
State by the Legislature thereof.” Article II, Section 1, meanwhile, 
provides that “[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the 
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors.” In both cases, the 
state legislatures are authorized to regulate the “[m]anner” of election, 
and, in both cases, that power is delegated in seemingly unlimited terms. 
B. The Limited Scope of the States’ Delegated Power over Presidential 
Elections 
The same sources of law to which the Court turned in Thornton to 
conclude that the Elections Clause of Article I does not empower states 
to adopt term limits for Congress likewise point to the conclusion that 
Article II does not empower states to select presidential electors based on 
the outcome of the national popular vote. Let’s begin with the history of 
the adoption of Article II. As noted above, at the Constitutional 
Convention, the framers expressly repudiated a nationwide popular 
election for the President.204 When Gouverneur Morris proposed just 
such a presidential election process, it was overwhelmingly defeated. 
Opponents worried not only that the people would not be sufficiently 
informed about candidates across the nation, but also that the process 
would be too majoritarian—that such a process would disadvantage 
voters in smaller states, who would be ignored in a purely majoritarian 
election system. Indeed, the desire to protect the interest of small states 
(and their citizens) explains not only the rejection of a direct, nationwide 
popular election for President but also the Convention’s subsequent 
decision to replicate the contours of the Great Compromise in allocating 
electors among the states: states would receive the number of electors as 
they possessed both representatives and senators in Congress. 
In fact, the framers created a presidential election process that was 
manifestly nonmajoritarian. Recall that the framers created a contingent 
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election procedure for elections in which no candidate receives a 
majority of the Electoral College. In the views of the framers, the 
presidential election would ordinarily be decided by the House of 
Representatives because few candidates would ever gain the required 
Electoral College majority.205 Indeed, the framers spent so much time 
crafting the contingent election process precisely because they thought it 
would be resorted to on a regular basis. Moreover—and this is a crucial 
point—the framers agreed that, when the presidential election fell to the 
House of Representatives under this process, each state’s delegation 
would act in a corporate capacity as a unit and cast one, equal vote on 
behalf of the state. Recall that the framers had originally decided to 
repose the contingent election procedure in the Senate, where each state 
receives an equal vote, but they feared the perceived aristocratic bias of 
the Senate. Allocating the contingent election procedure to the House but 
mandating that each state’s House delegation vote as a unit and cast one, 
equal vote replicated the Senate’s voting structure but without the 
aristocratic gloss. In essence, the framers not only expressly rejected a 
national popular election for President; they instead created an election 
process in which the crucial votes would be cast by individuals who 
almost assuredly would vote in accordance with the wishes of the voters 
in their state, not the undifferentiated nation at large.206 Moreover, 
popular sentiments would be aggregated in a manner that ignored 
population differences among the states. 
Against this backdrop, it is simply inconceivable that the framers 
thought that they were empowering the states to appoint their electors in 
accordance with popular sentiment outside the state, let alone a national 
poll. Having rejected Gouverneur Morris’ proposal for a direct 
nationwide popular election and having spent weeks crafting a 
complicated process in which states, as corporate bodies, would play an 
important role, the framers could not have imagined that those decisions 
could be undone by states, either acting alone or in concert, deciding to 
appoint their electors in accordance with the national vote. To be sure, 
the framers did not envision that every state would use a statewide poll to 
select its electors (thereby creating a facsimile of a nationwide election), 
and therefore they could not imagine that some states might choose to 
 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 144–45. 
 206. Recall that the U.S. Constitution does not require U.S. Representatives to be elected by 
district. That requirement was first imposed in 1842 by Congress by statute. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c 
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appoint their electors in accordance with the nationwide vote. 
Nevertheless, given the framers’ rejection of a direct popular election 
and their rejection of election processes that were insufficiently 
protective of small state prerogatives (such as election by Congress by 
joint ballot), their reaction to the NPVC can be safely inferred. 
Likewise, as in Thornton, the actual practice by states in the wake of 
the adoption of the Constitution informs the scope of state authority 
under Article II. In the first few presidential elections, some state 
legislatures appointed the electors themselves, while others provided for 
their selection through a popular election.207 Of those states that used 
popular elections, some used an at-large process that mimicked a winner-
take-all system; other states used a district system, while others used a 
hybrid combination of the two.208 Notably, under all of these systems, 
the presidential electors were selected in accordance with the sentiments 
of the voters in the state (or a district within it). Every state ultimately 
moved to a system of popular election, and most states embraced a 
winner-take-all system so as to maximize their electoral clout.209 No 
state, however, has ever appointed its electors in accordance with the 
national popular vote, even though since 1880 every state has conducted 
a state poll, thereby providing the opportunity for states to do so if they 
wished. 
Finally, considerations of democratic theory and constitutional 
structure point against reading Article II to permit states to appoint their 
electors on the basis of the national vote. At the outset, it is important to 
note that the NPVC does not promote democracy. Since 1880, every 
President has been selected via a process that is democratic. Because 
voters in every state vote for President and because those votes are 
transmitted faithfully into electoral votes—the winning electors almost 
invariably cast their ballots for the candidate to whom they were 
pledged—the current, state-by-state system is undeniably democratic. 
Rather, the charge leveled by critics of the Electoral College is that it is 
not sufficiently majoritarian—that the manner in which popular votes 
are aggregated into electoral votes may produce a President who received 
fewer popular votes than another candidate.210 As I have written 
elsewhere, the current system is largely majoritarian in structure and 
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effect.211 In only four presidential contests in the nation’s history has the 
winning candidate received fewer popular votes than the candidate 
elected President, and in all but one of those elections, the losing 
candidate failed to win a majority of the popular vote, undermining the 
suggestion (based on a claim of political majoritarianism at least) that the 
wrong candidate won. 
More importantly, though, majoritarianism is not synonymous with 
democracy. One can believe—as the framers very much did—in 
democracy but not majoritarianism, at least not in the strict sense urged 
by the NPVC’s supporters. Indeed, the Constitution creates a federal 
political structure that contains several nonmajoritarian elements, such as 
the Senate, the bicamerality and presentment requirements for federal 
legislation, and, most obviously, judicial review. Indeed, no less an 
authority than James Madison expressly described the governmental 
structure created by the Constitution—including, most notably, the 
presidential election process—as a “mixed” system that blended, in his 
words, “national” and “federal” characteristics.212 
To be sure, the NPVC differs from term limits for federal officers in 
that the latter prevented voters from reelecting a long-serving 
representative or senator, while the NPVC does not formally preclude 
any voter from voting for the presidential candidate of their choice. In 
that respect, the NPVC is not anti-democratic, at least as a formal 
matter.213 
The NPVC, however, does resemble the state-imposed term limits 
invalidated in Thornton in another manner: like state-imposed term 
limits, the NPVC alters a federal election process in which the voters in 
every state have an interest and does so in a manner that disregards the 
sentiment of voters who wish to keep the current system. It should go 
without saying that every U.S. citizen has an interest in the presidential 
election process. Unlike representatives or senators, the President is the 
one federal official who represents the entire nation. Indeed, if 
Oregonians have an interest in how the voters of Arkansas elect the 
representatives and senators from that state—as the Court in Thornton 
seemed to suggest—it follows a fortiori that they likewise have an 
interest in how Arkansas, California, or any state selects its presidential 
 
 211. Williams, supra note 9, at 195–203. 
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electors. The significance of that interest should not be overstated—an 
Oregonian, for example, surely cannot complain about ordinary election 
regulations, such as ballot access laws, adopted in other states—but 
neither should it be ignored entirely. As Thornton seems to suggest (or at 
least a best reading of this portion of the Thornton ruling), our 
constitutional structure presumes that states may not use their 
constitutionally delegated powers over the election of federal officials in 
a manner that fundamentally interferes with the constitutional structure. 
Both in structure and effect, the NPVC threatens the interest of 
voters in other states. The NPVC is a state-initiated interstate compact 
that will go into effect once a sufficient number of states comprising at 
least 270 electoral votes sign on to it. Once it does so, it does not matter 
whether voters in nonsignatory states desire to preserve the current state-
by-state electoral system; the national popular vote will be conclusive. 
Whether or not Congress could by statute require states to appoint their 
electors in accordance with the national popular vote,214 the notion that a 
group of states can, by their concerted action, transform the manner in 
which the President is elected cannot be right. If a group of states can 
agree to pledge their presidential electors on the basis of the national 
vote, then they must likewise be able to agree to pledge their electors to a 
candidate only from those states, only from one political party, or only in 
accordance with the wishes of a designated committee of “presidential 
experts.” In short, any interstate compact regarding the manner in which 
presidential electors are selected threatens to exclude the wishes of voters 
in nonsignatory states, and, therefore, it seems inconceivable that a 
Constitution that specifies how the President is to be elected and that lays 
out a process for amending its requirements would permit a group of 
states to alter so fundamental a part of our constitutional structure. 
C. But What About McPherson v. Blacker? 
Finally, McPherson v. Blacker does not contradict the foregoing 
analysis and suggest that state power over the manner in which 
presidential electors are selected is unlimited.215 There, the Court upheld 
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the Michigan legislature’s decision to switch from an at-large to a 
district-based popular election system for its presidential electors.216 To 
be sure, the Court used some expansive language, such as its untempered 
declaration that the Constitution “leaves it to the legislature exclusively 
to define the method [of selecting the electors].”217 That language, 
however, must be read in the context of the case. The Court was 
adjudicating the constitutionality of an appointment system that had been 
used by numerous states over time, including several in the first 
presidential election in 1789. Indeed, after the Court construed the text of 
Article II as giving the states “plenary authority,” it then conducted an 
extensive analysis of the Constitutional Convention and early, post-
Convention history regarding the various modes of appointment used by 
the states.218 In particular, the Court gave substantial weight to the 
framers’ expectation, voiced by Madison, that most states would adopt 
the district system.219 Moreover, the Court repeatedly emphasized that 
numerous states had used a district system in the first few presidential 
elections.220 This “contemporaneous practical exposition of the 
Constitution” was, in the words of the Court, “too strong and obstinate” 
to call into question the validity of the district system for electing 
presidential electors.221 
Far from supporting the constitutionality of the NPVC, then, 
McPherson actually calls it into question. First, McPherson’s extensive 
review of the Constitutional Convention debates and the electoral 
practices of the states in the wake of the adoption of the Constitution 
confirms the analytical approach endorsed here. As suggested above, the 
framers’ expectation regarding the method of appointment likely to be 
adopted by the states and the “contemporaneous practical exposition of 
the Constitution” necessarily informs the proper interpretation of state 
power under Article II. Second, McPherson validated a practice that both 
the framers expected to be used and that states had in fact used in the 
wake of the Constitution’s adoption. Neither can be said on behalf of the 
NPVC. No Framer—not even James Wilson, the most vocal proponent 
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of the direct election of the President—ever suggested that, under the 
system adopted by the Convention, the states could appoint their electors 
in accordance with a nationwide vote.222 Moreover, at no point in the 
history of the United States, let alone in the first few presidential 
elections, has a state appointed its electors in accordance with the 
popular vote outside the state. 
In sum, Article II gives states broad discretion to choose the manner 
of appointing their electors, but not every conceivable method of 
appointment falls within the scope of that discretion. States may choose 
to conduct popular elections, but the states’ appointment of electors must 
be based on the results of each state’s poll, not aggregated with those 
from other states. By attempting to provide for the direct popular election 
of the President, the NPVC attempts to reverse the framers’ decision to 
eschew such manner of election, and it therefore exceeds the power 
delegated by the Constitution to the states. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The NPVC seeks to effect a fundamental change in the presidential 
election process. But like other state-initiated attempts to circumvent the 
federal constitutional framework for federal elections, the NPVC does so 
in a way that exceeds the states’ constitutionally delegated authority. As 
the Court admonished in Thornton, change, if it is to be undertaken, 
“must come not by legislation adopted either by Congress or by an 
individual State, but rather—as have other important changes in the 








 222. Cf. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 812–13 (noting absence of suggestion by framers of existence 
of state power to be constitutionally significant). 
 223. Id. at 837. To be sure, that process is difficult in practice, but it is not impossible. In fact, 
many of the most recent constitutional amendments adopted by the states involve the Presidency. 
The Twentieth Amendment moved the inauguration to January 20 and addressed what happens when 
the President-elect dies before taking office; the Twenty-second Amendment limits the President to 
two terms; the Twenty-third Amendment gives the District of Columbia membership in the Electoral 
College; the Twenty-fourth Amendment bans poll taxes in federal elections, including presidential 
elections; and the Twenty-fifth Amendment addresses presidential incapacity and succession. 
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